

A CASE FOR PEACE PHOTOJOURNALISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND:

A MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS

Lisa A. SHEBIB

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ABSTRACT

Keywords: Peace, Peace Journalism, Photojournalism, Northern Ireland, Conflict Resolution

Contemporary studies of Peace Journalism have yet to examine how photographs, as visual content captured by print media, fit within the model of Peace Journalism. In this research, a content analysis of press images was conducted using predefined methodology on newspaper coverage of the annual July 12th Drumcree Parades (Marching) in Portadown, Northern Ireland, during the pre-, intra-, and post-peace process that occurred between 1996 and 2000. In most newspapers, the proportions of both violent/aggressive and nonviolent/non-peaceful content were higher in the relatively peaceful period of 2000, as compared to their proportions in at least one of the other 'violent' years of 1996 and 1998. No overall trend in content was observed in relation to the level of violence across 1996 to 2000. During this period, media practice in Portadown, Northern Ireland did not support the publication of newspaper commensurate with actual level of violence in the Northern Ireland or the depictions of peace building and the peaceful resolution of conflict. The implications of these findings for the development of 'Peace Photojournalism' are explored.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
GRRA	Garvaghy Road Residents' Association
IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NV/NP	Non-violent and Non-peaceful
OO	Orange Order
P/P	Peacemaking or Peaceful
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SF	Sinn Fein
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
UDA	Ulster Defense Association
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party
V/A	Violent or Aggressive

INTRODUCTION

“While the bombs and bullets may have stopped, the war of words and images went on.”
-- Jeffrey A. Sluka¹

0.1 Beyond War Photography

Photography that makes one think is difficult. In photographing destruction from a landmine explosion, bodies left from a genocidal massacre or a soldiers brandishing guns, you gain attention, sell newspapers, increase website traffic, and shock the viewer. But do you ultimately change thinking or behavior? What type of impact do these images have on the conflict itself and on the potential of its resolution?

Images are powerful in expressing narratives, can retain a longer memory life, and provoke powerful reactions. In times of conflict, these reactions may be even more powerful than the spoken or written word, as in the following examples:

- The photography of the fallen soldier by Robert Capa in the Spanish Civil War;
- The short clip images of the beheadings of the kidnapped foreign workers in Iraq on the stations Al-Manar and Al Jazeera;

¹ (Sluka, 1996), p.382

- The image of the young girl running from Napalm burns during the Vietnam War;
- The image of the planes crashing into the twin towers on September 11th, 2001;
- The angry and violent responses to the Danish and French cartoon depictions of the Prophet Mohammed that insulted Muslims and led to widespread protest and violence;
- And, more recently during the Syrian humanitarian crisis, three-year-old Aylan Kurdi lying facedown on the beach.

We are bombarded with typically negative images each day, often becoming desensitized and disinterested rather than motivated to act. Although we may fear a bombing or donate money to support famine relief efforts, we are rarely moved to long-term action, beyond the initial reaction of shock or rage. Further, these emotions are not inspired or complex; we respond viscerally, but are not necessarily challenged to think or to solve. For visual images to change behavior, they must provoke us to think beyond short-term, stereotypical, or knee-jerk reactions and beyond conventional ways of perceiving our world. While violent images of war and conflict highlight the repercussions of aggression, positive images fostering cultural understanding and peace building are lacking.

0.2 The Emergence of Peace Journalism

Peace Journalism seeks to address the media's role in conflict transformation through recognizing the role that the media plays in conflict, with particular focus on methods that media can use to mitigate its negative impact on conflict and to foster positive change in societies. Fundamental to its many approaches is developing an understanding of the skills in conflict resolution and engaging in complex analysis of conflict. Within the last two decades, the role of Peace Journalism has gained a growing acceptance in the field of conflict resolution, amongst peace researchers, peace practitioners, conflicting protagonists and media professionals. Peace Journalism encompasses multiple areas – Media Roles in Narrative; Media and Democratic Society; Media and Conflict; and Media and Peace-building – and all formats of media, including radio (spoken material), television (spoken and visual footage), the internet (spoken, written and visual), and print media (written stories and visual images including photographs and political cartoons). Other forms of media include: soap operas; animated programs or cartoons; documentaries; songs; plays; and others.

As a theoretical model and as a practical approach, Peace Journalism endeavours to challenge the inherent assumptions held in the traditional media regarding their impact on conflict. The initial step in any approach of peace journalism is to recognize that the media is never inherently unbiased or neutral. Simply by being present or active in violent conflict situations, the media is a party to the conflict. Furthermore, the choices made by members

of the media in selecting the stories they report and the way in which their narratives are constructed always contain some bias. Such bias is particularly apparent when violent and non-violent conflicts are reduced to simple dualities between two parties, ignoring or minimizing the broader complexity of players and detractors. The media's perspective is also narrowed by a short-term or myopic view of the conflict's timeline, one that often does not incorporate an understanding of the history and the current context of the conflict.

Numerous projects have assessed generally the relationship of peace building to the media. Several projects have documented the situation of conflict as perceived by one side or another in conflict, alongside exchange and dialogue projects. A further concept has been the creation of initiatives in which each of the parties in a conflict documents its own realities to share these images with the others. However, positive images are frequently lacking in media coverage of conflict situations and might otherwise disaggregate the conflict factions while highlighting the opportunities and potential for conflict resolution and conflict transformation within the various parties. Content analysis consists of an analysis of the content of media coverage, within a particular paper or on a specific conflict, by the press as a party to the conflict (Transcend, Glasgow Media Group).² In contrast, audience surveys are used in peace journalism to link the media messages to the impact on perceptions of the conflict, opportunities for conflict resolution and the perceptions of 'the other' (Glasgow Media Group).

² Available at: www.transcend.org/pctrcluj2004/TRANSCEND_manual.pdf

Prior research of the relationship between media and conflict has focused primarily on textual or print journalism, through conducting content analysis of the coverage of violent conflicts by various newspapers and other print publications. More recently, attention has been extended to an emerging critique of television media broadcasts. To date, the majority of media research in conflict areas has been focused on the evidence of media partiality between the conflicting parties and a preoccupation with the violent outcomes of conflict. This work has contributed substantively to an understanding of how the media can perpetrate harm and negatively influence violent conflict. Furthermore, this research has fostered a constructive debate over the media's purported characteristic of 'objectivity'.

The role in conflict of visual media, such as television images, online images, and print photography, has however not been well explored. Our lack of understanding of this role is related mainly to a lack of research in this area and methodological limitations of past content analysis and audience studies. Past work has been preoccupied with textual media, neglecting the potentially powerful role of visual media, such as photographs and other images appearing alongside written print coverage. In content analysis and audience studies conducted thus far (Glasgow Media Group; Gadi Wolfsfeld),^{3,4} the media has not been disaggregated, and the methods employed have not differentiated the visual content from the written or spoken material. Visual media is nevertheless a major independent component of media coverage and could significantly affect our perceptions

³ Ibid

⁴ (Wolfsfeld, 2004)

of conflict, including perceptions of whether opportunities exist for non-violent resolution and the parties to the conflict of 'the other'. The impact of narratives told through the visual specter (Marshall McLuhan; Susan Sontag; Roland Barthes)^{5,6,7} may differ from other forms of story telling, and those differences are not well characterized. Chiefly, there has been very little focus on the possible positive contributions of the visual rhetoric of peace journalism to the field of conflict resolution.

The present work thus seeks to examine how photographs, as visual content captured by the press media, fit within the model of Peace Journalism. This assessment will be performed through an analysis of the content of media images released by national newspapers in constructing their visual narratives during the conflict of Northern Ireland, from 1996 to 2000. The representation of this conflict through the newspapers' printed images will be characterized in terms of the agency's perception of the conflict and the different factions of the conflict, at measurement times that vary according to the intensity of the violence of conflict. In addition, this research seeks to introduce the concepts of peace photography and peace photojournalism into the peace and conflict lexicon.

⁵ (McLuhan, 1964)

⁶ (Sontag, 1990)

⁷ (Barthes, 1981)

0.3 Hypothesis

The basis for the hypothesis of this research is that the visual media is an integral yet overlooked component of Peace Journalism, both within its own theoretical model and in its potential contribution to peace-building and non-violent conflict resolution. It is hypothesized that, **across the period of 1996 to 2000, the content of newspaper images from democratic countries regarding the annual July 12th Drumcree parades in Portadown, Northern Ireland does not vary according to level of violence in the Northern Ireland conflict and lacks depictions of peace building and the peaceful resolution of conflict.**

To evaluate this hypothesis, this research will appraise the content of press images during the above period and examine how the news photograph fits within the model of peace journalism and its potential contributions to processes of peace-building and non-violent conflict resolution. Evaluation will focus on newspaper photographic coverage of the Parade (Marching) Season representing the conflict in Northern Ireland, during the pre-, intra-, and post-peace process that occurred between 1996 and 2000. A content analysis of media practice will examine visual images, their relationship to the political events in the conflict and peace process as reported to printed text, and their potential consequences for the conflict and its resolution.

Due to the limitations of its methodology, this research is unable to conduct the necessary audience surveys necessary to demonstrate a link between

photographic images, audience perception and resulting action. However, taking the present work together with recent research by various media research groups linking content analysis and audience surveys, some deductions may be drawn to understand the probable relation between photographic material and conflict processes.

Although this work cannot define the causal pathways between visual images, words and actions in conflict settings, it serves to expand the existing bodies of research in media and peace journalism, illuminating the potential impact of visual narratives. Furthermore, this paper seeks to introduce the concepts of peace photography and peace photojournalism into the lexicon of peace and conflict disciplines.

0.4 Key Research Questions

Key background questions in considering the visual media's contribution to conflict resolution are as follows:

- What is the model for Peace Journalism and to what extent does this incorporate the visual media?
- How have visual media and more specifically, photojournalism, covered conflict in the past? Does photojournalism coverage change over time in parallel to a peace process?

- What impact does photojournalism have on the parties to the understanding and potential resolution of conflict?
- How can visual media, specifically peace photojournalism, contribute to positive conflict transformation?

Although this list is not exhaustive, exploring these questions offers potential opportunities to widen the scope of the field of Peace Journalism, by examining the current use and potential impact of visual media on war, peace-building and non-violent conflict resolution.

0.5 Overview of Methodology

As outlined earlier, this research seeks to analyze how news photographs fit within the model of Peace Journalism and contribute to processes of peace-building and non-violent conflict resolution, through a content analysis of the media practices of national newspapers during the conflict of Northern Ireland, as expressed during the summer Orange Order Parades between 1996 and 2000.

To help address the underlying research questions, the present work will examine the photographic coverage of this conflict in Northern Ireland by conducting a content analysis of media practice in the use of photographs conveying the conflict and considering the visual narratives they provide for understanding, aggravating or contributing to its resolution. Several

methodological approaches will be employed. First, a literature review of previous research in the fields of media studies, journalism, and peace studies will evaluate any focus, or lack thereof, on visual media, prioritizing content analyses and interpretive models. Second, a content analysis will be undertaken of photographic images used by newspapers in Northern Ireland, The Republic of Ireland and Britain to communicate perceptions and understanding of the conflict, during their coverage of the 1996, 1998, and 2000 Marching Seasons in Northern Ireland. Third, in extrapolating from previous research of audience surveys and theory, the research will consider the potential impact of these photographs on the conflict and further areas for audience impact as future research. Finally, this paper will include an analysis of the emerging field of visual methodology and consider how it may be used in peace and conflict research to contribute to a clearer understanding of the relationship between visual media and conflict resolution.

0.6 Definitions and Concepts

A number of concepts and definitions merit clarification as background to this research.

As per Encarnacion et al. (1990),⁸ *conflict* signifies the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups. This definition suggests a broader interval of time and a wider range of struggle than those of purely armed conflict. Usage of the term conflict will apply to any political conflict, whether it is pursued by

⁸ (Encarnacion, McCartney, & Rosas, 1990)

peaceful means or by the use of force.⁹ *Conflict resolution* carries the more comprehensive implication that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed. This definition implies that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been modified.¹⁰

In some analyses, *conflict transformation* represents a significant extension of conflict resolution, but which in our view represents its deepest level. It describes a profound transformation in the institutions and discourses that perpetuate violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves and in their relationships. It corresponds to the underlying tasks of structural and cultural peace building.¹¹ *Peace building* underpins the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between parties in conflict. With reference to the conflict triangle of Galtung, explained in the next chapter, it can be posited that peacemaking aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peacekeeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, and peace building tries to overcome the contradictions residing at the root of the conflict.^{12,13}

Peace Journalism was the term first coined by Johan Galtung, who set out a model for Peace Journalism that will be considered more closely in the next chapter. At this point, the following definition by Lynch and McGoldrick will suffice as a preliminary introduction: "Peace Journalism is when editors and

⁹ Ibid, p.27

¹⁰ Ibid, p.29

¹¹ Ibid, p.29

¹² Ibid, p.30

¹³ (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.112

reporters make choices – of what stories to report and how to report them – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict.” Building on this definition, this paper will introduce the term *‘Peace Photojournalism’* to describe the specific subset of practice of Peace Journalism that uses imagery to explain and ascribe meaning to conflicts: “when photographers and editors make choices in how they make, select and use the visual capture of conflict – in particular photography – in such a way as to limit the potential harmful effects of these images and to offer alternative images and explanations that exploit the potential opportunities for peaceful, non-violent conflict resolution.”

0.7 Embracing “Peace Photography”

“So we must fix our vision not merely on the negative expulsion of war, but on the positive affirmation of peace.” – Martin Luther King, Jr.

Formulating the concept of ‘peace photojournalism’ is not purely an academic exercise. The sea of images of conflict that immerses us has a profound impact on our perception of the world, articulation of the ‘other’, and our potential for peace. For this reason, I suggest endorsing the term ‘peace photography’ which presents photographs and visual narratives in such manner to motivate us to think in new ways, challenging our perceptions and inspiring us to search for solutions to conflict. Following the tradition of peace journalism, peace photography – and the specialized discipline of peace photojournalism within it – emphasize context, minimize stereotypes and suggest solutions to the resolution of violent conflicts by peaceful means.

These often ‘unseen images’ characteristic of peace photojournalism may not sell newspapers, because they are not seen as sufficiently sensational or captivating, yet they have the potential to increase understanding of the ‘other’, resolve conflict, build bridges between factions, and inspire us to make possible pathways to peace that are often dismissed as improbable. Ideally, these images should grace our headlines, offering attainable solutions and hope for the future. The goal of peace photojournalism is to advance everyday peace building through documenting the actions of citizenry to construct a more peaceful world, with emphasis on the following objectives:

- To provide models of everyday behaviors that foster peace;
- To highlight conflict resolution principles at a local level;
- To underline the possibility for everyday ‘oases of peace’, even in situations where conflict and oppression are particularly pronounced;
- To embrace the dynamic quality of human dignity and the spirit of peace; and
- To inspire individuals to take personal responsibility for peace in their own lives.

The key to the evolution of peace photojournalism and to peace photography more generally, is to make the possibility of peace visible through the images we choose to capture and to exhibit.

“... A thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible when it is seen.”
– Plato

CHAPTER ONE – Conflict Resolution and Peace

Journalism

1.0 Introduction

To consider the ways in which the media can contribute to conflict transformation, it is important to first review several key underlying elements from the field of conflict resolution and the emerging literature of Peace Journalism.

1.1 Conflict Resolution

In the late 1960s, Johan Galtung^{14,15} proposed an influential model of conflict that encompasses both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. He depicted conflict as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A), and behaviour (B) at its vertices.¹⁶ Contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes “the actual or perceived ‘incompatibility of goals’ between the conflict parties, which is generated by what Mitchell calls a ‘mis-match between social values and social structure’”.¹⁷ In a symmetric conflict, the parties, their interests, and the clash of interests between them define contradiction. In an asymmetric conflict, the parties, their relationship, and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship define it.¹⁸ Attitude includes the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of

¹⁴ (J. Galtung, 1969)

¹⁵ (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.72

¹⁶ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011), p.10

¹⁷ Ibid, p.10

¹⁸ Ibid, p.10

themselves. These perceptions can be positive or negative, but “in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred”. Attitudes include also emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (will) elements.¹⁹

Galtung observes conflict as “a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another”.²⁰ All three components have to be present together in a full conflict.²¹ A “conflict structure without conflictual attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or structural) one”.²² Eventually, however, resolving the conflict necessitates the de-escalation of conflictual behaviour, an attitudinal shift, and a transformation of the relationships at the core of the conflict structure.²³

Further, a distinction exists “between direct violence (e.g., children are murdered), structural violence (children die through poverty), and cultural violence (whatever binds us to this or seeks to justify it)”.²⁴ Direct violence can be remedied by changing conflict behaviour, structural violence by removal of structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by addressing attitudes.²⁵ Peacekeeping, peace building and peacemaking relate to these concepts of change. Galtung also “defined ‘negative peace’ as

¹⁹ Ibid, p.10

²⁰ Ibid, p.11

²¹ Ibid, p.11

²² Ibid, p.11

²³ Ibid, p.11

²⁴ Ibid, p.11

²⁵ Ibid, p.11

the cessation of direct violence and 'positive peace' as the overcoming of structural and cultural violence".²⁶

Conflict as social change expresses the "heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints". Our response to conflict depends however on habitual responses, which are amenable to change, as well as the exercise of intelligent choices.²⁷

Third-Party Intervention

Hostility and escalation between two parties is easily fueled through feedback. The "entry of a third party may alter the conflict structure and allow a different pattern of communication to emerge, enabling the third party to filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behaviours" of the conflicting parties, curtailing this feedback.²⁸

Mediators have been often seen as 'powerless' – "their communications are powerful, but they bring to bear no new material resources of their own".

Such third parties can nevertheless influence not only the structure of communication but also the balance of power.²⁹ In both respects, the media may potentially act as a third party, at least in terms of possessing the influence of 'soft' power. Hard power "has always been important in violent

²⁶ Ibid, p.11

²⁷ Ibid, p.17

²⁸ Ibid, pp.21

²⁹ Ibid, pp.21-22

conflict, but soft power may be more important in conflicts managed peacefully”.³⁰

Symmetric and Asymmetric Conflicts

Conflicts of interest between relatively similar parties are examples of *symmetric* conflicts. In contrast, *asymmetric* conflicts arise between “dissimilar parties, such as conflicts between a majority and a minority, an established government and a group of rebels, a master and his servant, or an employer and her employees”.³¹ In such conflicts, “the root of the conflict lies not in particular issues or interests that may divide the parties, but in the very structure of who they are and the relationship between them. It may be that this structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed without conflict”.³² The third party facilitates this transformation, confronting the party with most power, availing itself of non-coercive strategies.³³ In this role, media could objectively influence asymmetrical conflicts, by transforming previously non-peaceful or unbalanced relationships into peaceful ones.³⁴

New Developments in Conflict Resolution

Classical conflict resolution has been mainly concerned with entry into conflict itself and enabling parties in violent conflict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways. A contemporary approach is to adopt a

³⁰ Ibid, p.22

³¹ Ibid, p.24

³² Ibid, p.24

³³ Ibid, p.24

³⁴ Ibid, p.24

broader view of “the timing and nature of intervention”.³⁵ The new patterns of major armed conflict that became prominent in the 1990s suggested the need for a more nuanced model of conflict emergence and transformation. In this model, conflict formations arise from “social change, leading to a process of violent or non-violent transformation, and resulting in further social change in which hitherto suppressed or marginalized individuals or groups come to articulate their interests and challenge existing norms and power structures”.³⁶ As a consequence, the scope of third-party intervention has been differentiated and broadened.

Lederach’s (1997) model, consisting of levels of conflict resolution and conflict transformation, emphasized “‘bottom-up’ processes and the suggestion that the middle level can serve to link the remaining two levels”.³⁷ Encarnacion et al. have formulated models of third-party intervention to highlight the way in which “external parties may become core parties” with increasing involvement, and “to emphasize the importance of ‘embedded parties’ from inside the conflict who often play key roles in expediting moves toward conflict resolution”.³⁸ A general trend has been a shift from regarding “third-party intervention as the primary responsibility of external agencies towards appreciating the role of internal ‘third parties’ or indigenous peacemakers”. This transition suggests the replacement of individual track models with a multi-track model, in which emphasis is placed on the importance of indigenous resources and local actors. In dynamic terms, depending on the stage reached in the conflict, the overall aim is to work to

³⁵ Ibid, p.26

³⁶ Ibid, p.26

³⁷ Ibid, p.26

³⁸ Ibid, p.26

prevent the narrowing of political space associated with conflict escalation and to promote the expansion of political space associated with conflict de-escalation and transformation.³⁹

Of particular note, the aim of conflict resolution is not the elimination of conflict, as evident in Curle's model of the transformation of asymmetric conflicts, which is even sometimes "undesirable".⁴⁰ Rather, conflict resolution serves to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into "peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change".⁴¹

Edward Azar's Theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

With the concept of 'protracted social conflict', the sources of such conflict lay predominantly within, as well as across, rather than between states.⁴²

Drawing on the work of Sumner (1906), Gurr (1970), Mitchell (1981), and others, Azar traced the process by which mutually exclusionary "experiences, fears and belief systems" generate "reciprocal negative images which perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify protracted social conflict".⁴³

Antagonistic group histories, exclusionist myths, demonizing propaganda and dehumanizing ideologies are deployed to justify discriminatory policies and legitimize atrocities. In a dynamic known as the "security dilemma", actions in such circumstances are mutually interpreted in the most threatening light: "the worst motivations tend to be attributed to the other side", the capacity for

³⁹ Ibid, pp.28-29

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.32

⁴¹ Ibid, p.32

⁴² (Azar, 1990), p.15

⁴³ (Encarnacion et al., 1990), p.88

compromise and accommodation contracts, and “proposals for political solutions become rare, and tend to be perceived on all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control”.⁴⁴ In this vein, this threatening dynamic gives rise to inhospitable images of “the other”.

1.2 Peace Journalism

What is Peace Journalism?

The original Peace Journalism model was set out, and presented in tabular form, by Professor Johan Galtung, a founder of the academic subject of Peace Studies and the set of analytical and fieldwork methods known as Peace Research. Peace Journalism is a growing discipline within numerous university courses – Conflict and Peace Studies, Media and Communications Studies, Development Studies, International Relations, and of course all branches of Journalism.⁴⁵ Essential differences between Peace Journalism and War Journalism are outlined in the following table⁴⁶:

⁴⁴ (Azar, 1990), p.15

⁴⁵ (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.195

⁴⁶ (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996)

PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM	WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM
<p>I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTED</p> <p>Explore conflict <u>formation</u>, x parties, y goals, z issues general 'win, win' orientation</p> <p>Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture</p> <p>Making conflicts transparent</p> <p>Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding</p> <p>See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity</p> <p>Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapon</p> <p><u>Proactive</u>: prevention before any violence/war occurs</p> <p>Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)</p>	<p>I. WAR/VIOLENCE-ORIENTED</p> <p>Focus on conflict <u>arena</u>, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation</p> <p>Closed space, closed time; causes and exists in arena, who threw the first stone</p> <p>Making wars opaque/secret</p> <p>'Us-them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us'</p> <p>See 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war</p> <p>Dehumanization of 'them'; more so the worse the weapon</p> <p><u>Reactive</u>: waiting for violence before reporting</p> <p>Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)</p>
<p>II. TRUTH-ORIENTED</p> <p>Expose untruths on all sides/ uncover all cover-ups</p>	<p>II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTED</p> <p>Expose 'their' untruths/ help 'our' cover-ups/lies</p>
<p>III. PEOPLE-ORIENTED</p> <p>Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children, giving voice to the voiceless</p> <p>Give name to all evil-doers</p> <p>Focus on people peace-makers</p>	<p>III. ELITE-ORIENTED</p> <p>Focus on 'our' suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece</p> <p>Give name of their evil-doers</p> <p>Focus on elite peace-makers</p>
<p>IV. SOLUTION-ORIENTED</p> <p>Peace = non-violence + creativity</p> <p>Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war</p> <p>Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society</p> <p>Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation</p>	<p>IV. VICTORY-ORIENTED</p> <p>Peace = victory + ceasefire</p> <p>Conceal peace initiatives, before victory is at hand</p> <p>Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society</p> <p>Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again</p>

As elaborated by Johan Galtung,^{47,48} Peace Journalism is often misunderstood as ‘advocating peace’. In fact, ‘giving peace a chance’ in national and international debates, by ensuring that non-violent responses to conflict receive fair consideration, would be a more constructive vantage.⁴⁹ Limitations in the manner in which news is reported are systemic and diminish consideration of non-violent conflict resolution. Such shortcomings result from the application of well-established reporting conventions, embedded in the values and practices of journalism, which are linked, in turn, with underlying and often unchallenged concepts of both news and conflict.⁵⁰ The Peace Journalism model offers a basis for identifying and rethinking these concepts, values and practices alike.

Peace Journalism results from editors and reporters making choices – in particular, the stories to report and the approach to reporting them – that create opportunities for society to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict. Peace Journalism:

- Uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting
- Provides a new route map tracing the connection between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention

⁴⁷ (J. Galtung, 1969)

⁴⁸ (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.72

⁴⁹ Ibid, p.xxi

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.5

- Builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting.

Peace Journalism can be seen as a set of tools, both conceptual and practical, intended to equip journalists to offer a better public service. It intersects within and around media in many parts of the world, over issues of representation and context.

Avoiding War Journalism

News organisations and journalists do not generally examine the assumptions underlying many of their common decisions in their reporting or their impact in shaping public understanding – let alone their influence over the actions and motivations of parties to the conflict.⁵¹ News values – the set of precepts guiding professional journalists in their work as gatekeepers to legitimate news stories – vary in content, source, and process for their establishment. When patterns in reporting can be discerned, such as when the elements omitted are always, or usually, the same, researchers can gather evidence of news values, enabling them to deduce the criteria by which the journalists render their gatekeeping decisions.⁵²

Pernicious elements of War Journalism often constrain the coverage of conflict. An important example was the cover of Newsweek magazine that

⁵¹ Ibid, p.196

⁵² Ibid, pp.196-7

framed a conflict as a bipolar state, similar to a tug of war, underpinning all the other issues.⁵³ In such instances, readers and audiences are led – or left, by crucial omissions in the reporting – to overvalue violent or reactive responses to conflict issues, and to undervalue non-violent, developmental ones. Audiences may also be uninformed of fundamental contraindications to assertions in support of violence, or they are led to attach little significance to them.

War Journalism – in particular, the patterns of omission and marginalization that have been identified in the way news organizations respond to many conflicts – cannot be explained solely as a “reflect[ion of] the perspectives and interests” of those in charge of them.⁵⁴ If we assume that War Journalism predominates because it reflects the interests of the media-owning class, then it is conceivable that this class has a predominant interest in violence as a response to conflict.⁵⁵ To avoid the pitfalls posed by these patterns of omission and marginalization, a different, more informative strategy is required.⁵⁶

A 17-point plan for practical Peace Journalism

To formulate and implement such a strategy, the following points have been suggested to re-balance the reporting of conflicts, while countering the distorting or often unexamined influence of War Journalism.

⁵³ Ibid, p.28

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.200

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.197

⁵⁶ Ibid, p.28

	AVOID	INSTEAD
1	Portraying a conflict as consisting of only two parties contesting the same goal(s). The logical outcome is for one to win and the other to lose.	Try to DISAGGREGATE the two parties into many smaller groups, with many needs and interests, pursuing many goals, opening up more creative potential for a range of outcomes. And ask yourself – who else is involved, and how?
2	Avoid accepting stark distinctions between 'self' and 'other'. These can be used to build the sense that another party is a 'threat' or 'beyond the pale' of civilized behaviour. Both are key justifications for violence.	Seek the 'other' in the 'self' and vice versa. If a party is presenting itself as 'the goodies', ask questions about how different its behaviour really is to that it ascribes to the other – isn't it ashamed of itself?
3	Treating a conflict as if it is only going on in the place and at the time that violence is occurring	Try to trace the links and consequences for people in other places now and in the future. Ask: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who are all the people with a stake in the outcome? • How do these stakeholders relate to each other? • Who gains from the conflict? • What are they doing to influence the conflict? • What will happen if...? • What lessons will people draw from watching these events unfold as part of a global audience? How will enter the calculations of parties to future conflicts near and far?
4	Assessing the merits of a violent action or policy of violence in terms of its visible effects only.	Try to find ways of reporting on the invisible effects, e.g., The long-term consequences of psychological damage and trauma, perhaps increasing the likelihood that those affected will be violent in future, either against other people or, as a group, against other groups or other countries.
5	Avoid letting parties define themselves by simply quoting their leaders restatements of familiar demands or positions.	Enquire for yourself into goals, needs and interests; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How are people on the ground affected by the conflict in everyday life? • What do they want changed? • Who else is speaking up for them besides their political leaders? <p>Answers to this are often surprisingly accessible as even many small grassroots organizations now have websites.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the position stated by their leaders the only way or the best way to achieve the changes they want? • This may help to empower parties to clarify their needs and interests and articulate their goals, making creative outcomes more likely.

6	Concentrating always on what divides the parties, on the differences between what each say they want.	Try asking questions that may reveal areas of common ground, and leading your report with answers that suggest that at least some goals, needs and interests may be compatible, or shared.
7	Only reporting the violent acts and describing 'the horror'. If you exclude everything else, you suggest that the only explanation for violence is previous violence (revenge); the only remedy, more violence (coercion/punishment).	Show how people have been blocked and frustrated or deprived in everyday life as a way of explaining how the conditions for violence are being produced.
8	Blaming someone 'starting it'.	Try looking at how shared problems and issues are leading to consequences which all the parties say they never intended.
9	Focusing on exclusively on the suffering, fears and grievances of only one party. This divides the parties into 'villains' and 'victims' and suggests that coercing or punishing the villains represents a solution.	Treat as equally newsworthy the suffering, fears and grievances of all parties.
10	'Victimizing' language like 'devastated', 'defenseless', 'pathetic', 'tragedy' which only tells us what has been done to and could be done for a group of people by others. This is disempowering and limits the options for change.	Report on what has been done and could be done by the people. Don't just ask them how they feel; also ask them how they are coping and what they think. Can they suggest any solutions?
11	The imprecise use of emotive words to describe what has happened to people, such as the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 'tragedy' is a form of drama, originally Greek in which someone's fault or weakness ultimately proves his or her undoing. 'assassination' is the murder of the head of state. 'massacre' is the deliberate killing of people known to be unarmed and defenseless. Are we sure? Or do we not know? Might these people have died in battle? 'systematic' – e.g., Raping, or forcing people from their homes. Has it really been organized in a deliberate pattern, or have there been a number of unrelated, albeit extremely nasty, incidents? 	Always be precise about what we know. Do not minimize suffering but reserve the strongest language for the gravest situations or you will beggar the language and help to justify disproportionate responses that escalate the violence.
12	Demonizing adjectives like 'vicious', 'cruel', 'brutal', and 'barbaric'. These always describe one parties' view of what another party has done. To use them puts the journalist on that side and helps to justify an escalation of violence.	Report what you know about the wrongdoing and give as much information as you can about the reliability of other people's reports or descriptions of it. If it is still be investigated, say so, as a caution that the truth may not yet be known.
13	Demonizing labels like 'terrorist', 'extremist', 'fanatic', and 'fundamentalist'. These are	Try calling people by the names they give themselves. Or be more precise in your

	<p>always given by 'us' to 'them'. No one ever uses them to describe himself or herself. And they are difficult, if not impossible, to apply impartially in every instance where they would be warranted. In practice, therefore, to use such labels is to take sides. They also generally mean the people labeled are unreasonable, which weakens the case for reasoning (negotiating) with them.</p>	<p>descriptions – e.g., 'bombers' and, for the attacks of September 11th, 'suicide hijackers' are both less partisan and give more information than 'terrorists'.</p>
14	<p>Focusing exclusively on the human rights abuses, misdemeanors and wrongdoings of only one side.</p>	<p>Try to name all wrongdoers, and treat allegations made by all parties in a conflict equally seriously. This means, not taking at face value, but instead making equal efforts to establish whether any evidence exists to back them up, treating the victims with equal respect and the finding and punishing of all wrongdoers as being of equal importance.</p>
15	<p>Making an opinion or claim seem like an established fact. This is how propaganda works – e.g., The campaign, primarily aimed at US and UK media, to link Saddam Hussein to 'international terrorism' in early 2002 under a headline linking Iraq to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, came the claim that 'Iraqi military intelligence officers are said to be assisting extreme Palestinian groups in attacks on Israel...'. 'Said to be' obscures the question of who is doing the saying. See also 'thought to be', 'it's being seen as', etc.</p>	<p>Tell your readers or your audience who said what. That way you avoid implicitly signing up yourself and your news service to the allegations made by one party in the conflict against another.</p>
16	<p>Greeting the signing of documents of leaders that bring about military victory or ceasefire as necessarily creating peace.</p>	<p>Try to report on the issues that remain, and on the needs and interests of those affected. What has to happen in order to remove incentives for further acts of violence?</p> <p>Ask what is being done to strengthen the means on the ground to handle and resolve conflict non-violently, to address development or structural needs in the society and to create a culture of peace?</p>
17	<p>Waiting for leaders on 'our' side to suggest or offer solutions.</p>	<p>Pick up and explore peace initiatives wherever they come from. Ask questions of politicians – e.g., About ideas put forward by grassroots organizations. Assess peace perspectives against what you know about the issues the parties are really trying to address; do not simply ignore them because they do not coincide with established positions. Include images of a solution, however partial or fragmentary – they may help to stimulate dialogue.</p>

In the past decade, further work has demonstrated an ongoing need for a shift in the dominant mode of coverage from ‘peace/conflict’ to ‘war/violence’, while contrasting the elements between these two modes.^{57,58,59}

Reflecting or constructing?

We have observed that the fundamental role of journalism is ideally understood as playing a part in constructing the world around it – forming realities and shaping discussion of events. This point is not merely semantic.⁶⁰ Indeed, the tendency of War Journalism to portray violence as its own cause, devoid of context, invites further violence as an appropriate solution to conflict.⁶¹ Most US media reported the ‘9/11’ attacks as a ‘bolt from the blue’, whilst shouting down anyone attempting to contextualize them.

Advocating an alternate response – non-violent action based on co-operation to uphold international law – requires first reckoning with War Journalism, as its approach is that any initiative that is not unequivocally ‘winning’ risks being reported as ‘losing’ or ‘backing down’. A violent response – with a matching strategy of propaganda – is often argued as a more certain bet.⁶² Parties to conflict factor the impact of War Journalism into their interests and perspectives and developing their policies and propaganda. War Journalism and war propaganda are coterminous. Understanding the origins of news

⁵⁷ (Lynch, 2008)

⁵⁸ (Lynch, 2015)

⁵⁹ (Keeble, Tulloch, & Zollmann, 2010)

⁶⁰ (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.200

⁶¹ Ibid, p.201

⁶² Ibid, p.201

values or reporting conventions in a conflict, especially how and why they arise, is thus necessary.

The liberal theory of press freedom

One of the most eloquent exponents of liberal theory was the nineteenth-century British philosopher John Stuart Mills.⁶³ In this theory's framework, the free flow of information – especially if it brings about a collision of competing perspectives – is not only intrinsically valuable, but is also defensible on a utilitarian basis, as a service that strengthens the function of society. The growth of media thus conferred societal good but also carried major implications for the integrity of its reporting conventions.

The growth of mass media

With the pressures underlying the growth and changes of media, the essential nature of journalism also changed, to ensure its commercial viability. Niche marketing gave way to mass marketing. At one time, journalism readily dismissed its adherents, or absorbed a relatively small, local constituency in their own distinct concerns. In its commercial expansion, media agencies needed to refrain from marginalizing or perturbing any of its potential customers.⁶⁴ Hence the rise of what we now regard as Journalistic Objectivity (throughout the rest of this chapter, we denote it with a capital 'O') as an industry standard describes in fact a set of conventions that serve to present

⁶³ Ibid, p.201

⁶⁴ Ibid, p.202

the news as 'all things to all people' – or, at least, to satisfy stakeholders with sufficient capital to purchase the coverage.⁶⁵

Journalistic Objectivity – the big 'O'

Objectivity, as an ethos in journalism, was a phenomenon of the Enlightenment, during which the necessary political, economic and social changes were imbricated.⁶⁶ Variably defined, such objectivity conferred a considerable commercial advantage on news reporting as a commodity. Journalism imbued with objectivity would be less likely to disquiet potential consumers among the educated classes, with the emergence of political dispensations that followed Enlightenment-inspired reforms and upheavals. Therefore, most consumers would likely find such journalism palatable.

For any news event, the initial decision of reporters and editors relates to their role as gatekeepers: why should they cover a particular story, rather than another? The second question is then: why this source, and not another? As the methodology of objective journalism became industrial convention, this second issue was mollified by the practice of indexing – projecting such source decisions on to an external frame of reference that was not, apparently, selected by the journalist.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.203

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.203

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.203

Official Sources

In practice, indexing often meant tracking the agenda set by official sources – governments, police, the courts, financial authorities, and similar bodies.⁶⁸

Interpretation of which facts are most meaningful for a given event on a particular day is subjective but is often presented as having been made on a seemingly 'neutral' basis. Such news values are deeply embedded in both the systems and the practice of media agency.⁶⁹ As a consequence, bias in favour of official sources remains probably the single most widespread convention in coverage of global news.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Ibid, p.203

⁶⁹ Ibid, p.204

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.204

Chapter Two – Photojournalism

“Ultimately, photography is subversive not when it frightens, repels, or even stigmatizes, but when it is pensive, when it thinks.”

– Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida*

2.0 Introduction

The photograph “communicates by means of its association with some hidden, or implicit text” – “a system of hidden linguistic propositions”.⁷¹

Sontag argued that the photograph can be treated as “narrowly selective transparency”.⁷² As a discourse, photographs provide “a system within which the culture harnesses photographs to various representational tasks”.⁷³

In contrast, photojournalists themselves have traditionally “ascribe[d] to a formal code of naturalism”.⁷⁴ Naturalism “refers to a communicative strategy which seeks to obscure the articulatory apparatus utilized in the production of a message, diminishing the perceived presence of an author and the significance of intent or point of view”.⁷⁵ However, while “an event has come to mean ... something worth photographing”, it is “ideology ... that determines what constitute[s] an event”. Sontag emphasizes that the moral impact of photographs depends on “the existence of a relevant political consciousness”.⁷⁶

⁷¹ (Sekula & Burgin, 1982), p.85

⁷² (Sontag, 1990), p.6

⁷³ (Sekula & Burgin, 1982), p.87

⁷⁴ (Schwartz, 1992), p.107

⁷⁵ Ibid, p.97

⁷⁶ (Sontag, 1990), pp.18-9

2.1 Photography and Photojournalism Theory

A distinctive characteristic of the photo is that it isolates a singular moment;⁷⁷ yet a solitary photograph can extend and replicate the human image to the level of mass production.⁷⁸ Human photography is a collective act: it cannot be created alone. In this manner, we discovered in the photograph the capacity for visual report without syntax.⁷⁹ Indeed, photography reflects instantaneously the external world, delivering a perfectly replicable image.⁸⁰ Indeed, “images are more real than anyone could have supposed”.⁸¹

However, to accept the convention that “the camera cannot lie” is merely to reinforce multiple misrepresentations.⁸² As stated by Schwartz, “the history of photojournalism helps explain the rhetorical stance that contemporary photojournalists and editors are adopting. The strategic elevation of recording above expression, of fact above art, that emerged along with the commercial press has encouraged denial of the constructed, authored nature of photographic representations”.⁸³ Education might seem the optimal approach to counter the misconceptions propagated in the media; yet, to date, little education or resources have been available to challenge the new media on their own terms.⁸⁴ We lack sufficient “literacy” that crosses various media, beyond individual narrowly defined enterprises. We are consequently poorly equipped to respond to the effect of dramatic changes in media

⁷⁷ (Barthes, 1981), p.204

⁷⁸ Ibid, p.205

⁷⁹ Ibid, p.206

⁸⁰ Ibid, p.206

⁸¹ (Sontag, 1990), p.180

⁸² (Barthes, 1981), p.209

⁸³ (Schwartz, Bonnie, & Hanno, 1999), p.180

⁸⁴ (Barthes, 1981), p.211

coverage that have resulted from new hybrids and inter-disciplinary forms of media coverage.⁸⁵ In the age of the image, for instance, language assumes a graphic or iconic character, whose “meaning” belongs little to the semantic universe, and not at all to the republic of letters.⁸⁶

To grasp the meaning of the photograph, we may adopt a perspective of ‘accelerated transience’.⁸⁷ That is, by emphasizing the transience of our environment, the photograph can alter our perceptions of temporal relationships, aging issues or symbols or relegating them to a past that may in fact be recent or still carry relevance. This perspective can risk accentuating negative effects of the photograph. Speeding up a temporal sequence is to abolish time, much as the telegraph and cable abolished space. The photograph can abolish both such aspects, which can have positive results as well.⁸⁸ For instance, this accelerated sequence can eradicate our national frontiers and cultural barriers, involving us in *The Family of Man*, regardless of any particular worldview. In this vein, a photograph of a group of people of any hue is simply a picture of people, not of “colored people”.⁸⁹ Similarly, observing a photograph of a local slum renders its conditions unbearable.⁹⁰ As a result, the world itself becomes a sort of museum of objects that have been encountered before in some other medium.⁹¹ This function provides the political rationale for the photograph.⁹² To some extent, however, all media permeates our lives with artificial

⁸⁵ Ibid, p.212

⁸⁶ Ibid, p.213

⁸⁷ Ibid, p.213

⁸⁸ Ibid, p.213

⁸⁹ Ibid, pp.213-4

⁹⁰ Ibid, p.214

⁹¹ Ibid, p.215

⁹² Ibid, p.214

perception and arbitrary values,⁹³ and can also desensitize us to the realities of the world depicted in the visual media.⁹⁴

Just as photography has been long regarded as “the visual medium best suited to take up the mantle of objectivity”,⁹⁵ photojournalism is similarly presented as “an objective record of reality for viewers”⁹⁶ and a “vision of the world easily consumed and digested”.⁹⁷ News images of ‘the other’, as portrayed in conflicts, are however not objective but are “socially constructed artifacts”.⁹⁸ Journalistic objectivity as a whole may be in fact shown to be a “social construct”.⁹⁹ Many lines of evidence support the observation that “photographers interpret reality rather than record it”.¹⁰⁰ Images are socially constructed through our decisions to create (e.g., photograph) and to publish them, in the institutional context of the mass media producing the photographs.¹⁰¹ In particular, images are often selected to “illustrate reporters’ stories”, and “a clear parallel can be found between the kinds of [print] stories newspapers run and the kinds of images staff photographers produce”.¹⁰² Not only do “photographs encode a photographer’s point of view”, “institutional requirements [constrain] his or her activities” in producing those images.¹⁰³

⁹³ Ibid, p.216

⁹⁴ Ibid, p.219

⁹⁵ (Schwartz et al., 1999), p.173

⁹⁶ (Schwartz, 1992), p.107

⁹⁷ Ibid, p.108

⁹⁸ Ibid, p.97

⁹⁹ Ibid, p.95

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p.180

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.97

¹⁰² Ibid, p.98

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.161

Further, “photo texts give clear instructions detailing how a news event should be photographed in order to produce the most complete narrative re-telling”,¹⁰⁴ with further influence exerted by “pre-conceived storyboards”.¹⁰⁵ Even when photojournalists approach the creation of their actual images with objectivity,¹⁰⁶ the ultimate choice of photographic subject matter in its publication by mass media is most seminal to how we understand a conflict and a peace process. Indeed, “comparing the characteristics attributed to photographs produced in differing institutional contexts suggests the important role the institutions themselves play in fixing public perceptions of photographic representations.”¹⁰⁷

The circumstances under which the depiction of victims in conflict may be effective and influence state policy forms a salient and unanswered question.¹⁰⁸ Journalistic selection of images primarily depicting violence and aggression can otherwise carry negative consequences that impede peace building and the resolution of conflict, or our understanding of the conflict. While “photographs cannot create a moral position ... they can reinforce one – and can help build a nascent one”.¹⁰⁹

2.2 War Photography

In war and conflict circumstances, photographic material portrays a cycle of violence. War Journalism depicts “violence as its own cause, stripped of

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p.99

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p.102

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.98

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, pp.160-161

¹⁰⁸ (Shaw, 1996), p.178

¹⁰⁹ (Sontag, 1990), p.17

context” and “invites the presentation of more violence as an appropriate remedy”.¹¹⁰ McGoldrick and Lynch explain further that the defining aspects of War Journalism “lead us ... to overvalue violent, reactive responses to conflict, and undervalue non-violent, development ones”.¹¹¹ As with the printed press of War Journalism, ‘War Photography’ may similarly omit, distort, or marginalize the material facts of a conflict, with “news organizations respond[ing] to so many conflicts” in these flawed or limited ways.¹¹² McGoldrick and Lynch¹¹³ expand on the tension between War Journalism and peaceful alternatives:

Anyone tempted to advocate responses such as this – non-violent, based on co-operation to uphold international law – would have to reckon with War Journalism, since it means anything that is not unequivocally ‘winning’ risks being reported as ‘losing’ or ‘backing down’. To argue for a violent response – and devise a propaganda strategy to match – is, in that sense, a safer bet.

Drawing on research experience in conflicts, Varis explains that the “structural factors and force of events facing the journalist in such a situation are more powerful in determining the journalist’s behavior and reporting than are the rules and procedures he brings with him”.¹¹⁴ Moreover, “most

¹¹⁰ (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005), p.201

¹¹¹ Ibid, p.197

¹¹² Ibid, p.200

¹¹³ Ibid, p.201

¹¹⁴ (Varis, 1987), p.361

traditions of communication research are war-oriented rather than peace-motivated”,¹¹⁵ which applies certainly to War Photography.

2.3 Visual Narratives, Objectivity and the ‘Other’

According to Harrison, most textbooks of research methodology prior to this century contained little discussion of ‘visual methodology’.¹¹⁶ Visual methodology describes any research design that uses any visual evidence, which may be produced by researchers or others.¹¹⁷ Only rarely is the visual material the sole data.¹¹⁸

Addressing the past neglect of visual methodology, numerous recent texts have reviewed visual material (such as Evans & Hall, 1999; Hall, 1997; Rose, 2001) and visual methodology (for example, Banks, 2001; Emmison & Smith, 2000; Pink, 2001; Prosser, 1998a), as referenced by Harrison.¹¹⁹ Most research studies that deployed visual images or visual technologies transposed images into words, distinguishing the topic of study from the forms of analysis of images (for example, Chaplin, 1994).¹²⁰ This limitation arose because cameras or images were used as a resource for, rather than the topic of, studies.¹²¹

To use visual material within a narrative or an investigation, we must examine if, and to what extent, the visual can be used to construct narratives,

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p.361

¹¹⁶ (Harrison, 2002), p.87

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p.88

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p.88

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.88

¹²⁰ Ibid, p.88

¹²¹ Ibid, p.88

its relationship to or dependence on written or verbal narration, and the manner in which visual narratives can provide us with data on experience.¹²²

These questions are addressed in the latter part of this paper. A related matter is the justification for omitting visual evidence from publication.¹²³

A second consideration is the importance of understanding the ways in which the visual ‘works’.¹²⁴ To borrow Berger’s phrase,¹²⁵ photography is primarily about the “ways of seeing”. Others, such as Barthes (1981),¹²⁶ posit that the symbolic forms of photographs – or indeed all forms of imagery – express the experience of others and can elicit discussion of that experience.¹²⁷

Photographic images carry a material and symbolic significance that serve as important modes of communication in social relations.¹²⁸ For the investigator, reflexivity between the image and the verbal response – or, generally, another expression – produces the data.¹²⁹ In Harrison’s work, we observe an erosion in the marginal nature of visual methodology, supplanted by a body of work in which researchers have used photography as a form of data for their work.¹³⁰ However, the possibility of visual narratives may need to encompass the idea that other forms of narration are essential to the realization of the context, content and meaning of the visual.¹³¹

¹²² Ibid, p.89

¹²³ Ibid, p.90

¹²⁴ Ibid, p.90

¹²⁵ (Berger, 1972)

¹²⁶ (Barthes, 1972)

¹²⁷ (Harrison, 2002), p.92

¹²⁸ Ibid, p.109

¹²⁹ Ibid, p.92

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.108

¹³¹ Ibid, p.108

2.4 Peace Journalism and Photography

Peace Journalism can be defined as the form of journalism in which “editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report and about how to report them – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict”.¹³² Peace Journalism arose as a “model for identifying and predicting patterns of omission and distortion in conflict coverage”.¹³³ Patterns of omission and distortion “not only lead us, or leave us, to overvalue reactive, violent responses – and to undervalue developmental, non-violent ones”.¹³⁴ It has served also to extend coverage of political “policy options beyond ‘pre-emptive war’ and ‘regime change’”.¹³⁵

Photojournalism rose to prominence during the Second World War,¹³⁶ serving primarily the development of wars and conflict. Wolfsfeld has noted that no major studies have examined the role of the news media in an ongoing peace process.¹³⁷ Similarly, none have evaluated the role of photography in news media coverage of peace.

2.5 Visual Methodology and Content Analysis

Broadly, social research of images applies three sets of questions: (i) what is the image of, or what is its content?; (ii) who took or produced the image, and when and why did they produce it?; and (iii) how do other people come to

¹³² (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005), p.3

¹³³ Ibid, p.1

¹³⁴ Ibid, p.5

¹³⁵ Ibid, p.3

¹³⁶ (Sontag, 2004), p.34

¹³⁷ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.8

have the image, how do they interpret it, and what do they do with it? Some of these questions are resolved by social research.¹³⁸

Visual researchers in the social sciences commonly claim that theirs is a minority field that is poorly understood and appreciated (e.g., Grady 1991; Prosser 1998b; cf. MacDougall 1997).¹³⁹ Seeing is not natural, despite our perceptions in this regard. As for all sensory experiences, the interpretation of sight is culturally and historically specific (e.g., Classen 1993).¹⁴⁰ Equally unnatural are the representations derived from vision – such as drawings, paintings, films, and photographs.¹⁴¹ While images are detected on the retina and interpreted continually by the brain, our second-order representations when we paint on canvas or animal skin, or when we open the shutter on a camera, carry discrete, specific intentions.¹⁴² In particular, we may understand the content of an image, but may fail to grasp or disregard the reason for which the image exists. Our initial understanding or interpretation of visual images can even be pre-formulated.¹⁴³ To understand the basis for an image, we must move beyond its content and examine the image as an object.¹⁴⁴ Re-examining images from a distance and interrogating them is essential to acquiring a broader perspective of their relevance.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁸ (Banks, 2001), p.7

¹³⁹ Ibid, p.1

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p.7

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p.7

¹⁴² Ibid, p.7

¹⁴³ Ibid, p.7

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p.3

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p.7

Our vision and assessment of visual material is often contextual or conditional, thus not universally applicable.¹⁴⁶ This limitation is typically imposed by language, as evident among cultures in which language predominates.¹⁴⁷ For example, the contexts of images in Euro-American societies are strongly influenced by language – both oral and written.¹⁴⁸ Displacing the visual from its original or local context defined by place and time, as well as constraining the visual to the domain of ‘art’, also limit the context of other images and thus their potential utility.¹⁴⁹ Even the concept of ‘reading’ a photograph simply invokes a term typically ascribed to the written word.¹⁵⁰

Images and their elements do not however possess their own ‘language’, in absolute or socially specific terms.¹⁵¹ Although images can carry particular meanings in a given society or culture, these meanings are usually highly dependent upon context and are impermanent.¹⁵² The properties of images, and our interpretation of them, are also not immutable.¹⁵³ Moreover, ‘reading’ a photograph implies that the ‘message’ can be discerned from the visual image alone, as if spoken; however, actual speech occurs between people through their social relationships.¹⁵⁴

The internal narrative of a photograph refers to the story conveyed by the content of an image. That narrative is not necessarily congruent with the

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, pp.8-9

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p.9

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p.8

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p.9

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, pp.9-10

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p.10

¹⁵² Ibid, p.10

¹⁵³ Ibid, p.11

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p.10

narrative that the image-maker intended to tell; in fact, these two stories can often be markedly disparate.¹⁵⁵ The external narrative consists of information regarding the nature of the world that extends beyond that of the photograph. Although they may be opposed, the external and internal narratives are interconnected in practice and share similar elements. Indeed, “consciously and unconsciously, critically and uncritically, we all – observers and observed – slip easily between reading internal and external narratives of images”.¹⁵⁶

Robust visual research demands a careful analysis of both the internal and external narratives.¹⁵⁷ Within all societies, visual practice is not only an “embedded social practice” but is also likely to be embedded in many different ways.¹⁵⁸ A broader form of analysis is important to understanding these narratives, including an appraisal of the external narrative that “goes beyond the visual text itself”, such as a caption or accompanying text.¹⁵⁹ In some cases, the ability of the photographic image to communicate multiple narratives is not so much confined by the caption and context as rendered impertinent.¹⁶⁰ This problem occurs in the use of some photographs in newspapers, as in the illustrations of a story that concern a person or a topic with which the reader may be unfamiliar.¹⁶¹ In other instances, film, videotape and photography in social research can perform functions that are not solely introductory or illustrative, but seek to express insights about society.¹⁶² A major difficulty in social research is the challenge in visually depicting the

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p.11

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p.44

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p.12

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, p.44

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, p.12

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p.15

¹⁶¹ Ibid, p.16

¹⁶² Ibid, p.17

conditions of human existence and similar abstract themes, clearly and without generalization.¹⁶³ Although material objects are readily illustrated in images, creating or selecting a visual image that illustrates an abstract concept – such as ‘society’, ‘culture’, ‘kinship’, or ‘unemployment’ – is much harder.¹⁶⁴

Similar to the need to distinguish the external and internal narratives when examining images, the social researcher must distinguish the *form* of a visual image from its *content*. While the form and content are linked, they can be analyzed separately, and their relationship can be characterized. An important consideration is the extent to which the form of an image dictates or mediates the content.¹⁶⁵ Also relevant is the extent – if any – to which the form or content is privileged over the other in a given social context.¹⁶⁶ Their relationship may also suggest the potential representations of a visual image.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Ibid, pp.17-18

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, pp.17-18

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, p.51

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, p.51

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p.53

Chapter Three – Northern Ireland

3.0 Introduction

To understand the context and chronology relevant to this case study, several major historical aspects of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the peace process merit review.^{168, 169, 170} A summary of the aims of various media covering the conflict within Northern Ireland follows. A chronology of major events in the conflict is compiled in the next chapter.

3.1 Northern Ireland Conflict and The Peace Process

Historical Perspectives

Over the past century, Northern Ireland's predominant confrontation has been the conflict over whether this state should remain part of the United Kingdom – as supported by Protestant Unionists – or become part of the Republic of Ireland as favoured by Catholic Nationalists.¹⁷¹ Before the twentieth century, Northern Ireland's population had been comprised of two-thirds Protestants and one-third Catholics. As outlined by McKittrick and McVea, this historical ratio shifted over the past century, in part as a result of political considerations, to approach one-to-one. Catholics now account for up to 45 per cent of the population. This increasing trend in the Catholic

¹⁶⁸ (McKittrick & McVea, 2000)

¹⁶⁹ (Weiss, 2000)

¹⁷⁰ (Spencer, 2004)

¹⁷¹ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.159

population, although unlikely to lead to a majority in the near future, has already substantively altered the country's political landscape in the setting of their "new Nationalist confidence".¹⁷²

Opposition between these two corresponding factions – Unionist and Nationalist – had been deeply rooted well before Britain established Northern Ireland in 1921. The settlement implemented in the 1920s only exacerbated such tension and political instability. Unionists were ultimately "vilified for an unwillingness to share power" from which they had long benefitted, especially under the system established by Britain.¹⁷³

As the troubles emerged in the latter half of twentieth century, Britain's lack of involvement and political miscalculations permitted aggression to intensify, including internment and Bloody Sunday.¹⁷⁴ First, the two new states were granted considerable autonomy. However, Unionists alone benefitted from their immutable British relationship, which later garnered them substantive subsidies. In addition, they were permitted "to run Northern Ireland much as they chose".¹⁷⁵ Unionism further dominated as a result of its populous majority and political advantages.¹⁷⁶ That the troubles were "a clash between two unreasonable warring tribes" – a historical British perspective¹⁷⁷ – was largely a misconception.^{178,179}

¹⁷² (McKittrick & McVea, 2000)

¹⁷³ Ibid, p.238

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, p.238

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, p.231

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p.231

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p.239

¹⁷⁸ (O'Farrell, 1998), p. 101

¹⁷⁹ (McKittrick & McVea, 2000), p.238

A lack of interest in civil rights, attributable in part to southern governments prioritizing a united Ireland, contributed also to this imbalance of power. After the 1920s, advancing civil rights interested mainly northern Nationalists, as this risked for others disrupting a “generally peaceful island”.¹⁸⁰

Institutionalized inequality also conferred to Protestants numerous systematic advantages. Catholics and Protestants were treated differently in politics, housing, employment, and most other areas affecting daily life.¹⁸¹ For decades, Catholics “believed they were treated as second-class citizens”.¹⁸²

The Early 1990s: A Volatile Peace Process

By the 1990s, a modern ‘peace process’ had reshaped the politics of Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations. This sluggish process was widely characterized as controversial, suspect, and circuitous.¹⁸³ In early 1993, its pace accelerated with a volatile series of events that stimulated “excitement, controversy, much violence and on occasion near-despair”.¹⁸⁴ Unveiled in December 1993, the Downing Street Declaration aimed to meld the concepts of self-determination and consent, without suggesting any British withdrawal: “The British government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish”.¹⁸⁵

When the Irish Republican Army (IRA) announced a ceasefire the following

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, p.231

¹⁸¹ Ibid, p.232

¹⁸² Ibid, p.232

¹⁸³ Ibid, p.184

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, p.190

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, p.196

August, the Nationalist community responded initially with “jubilation”. While Nationalists and Unionists believed that the conflict had subsided, the cessation statement attracted some suspicion. Unionists were “more uncertain”, especially as the IRA had not announced that the ceasefire would be durable.¹⁸⁶ Unionist politicians believed the announcement “a delusion and a trick”. Uncertainty regarding this new era grew also for Nationalists, with some questioning at first whether the Nationalist political party Sinn Féin “had reached some secret deal with the British government”.¹⁸⁷ Discrepant views of this part of the peace process would hamper it for many years.

Initially, however, “Reynolds [Taoiseach of Ireland] moved quickly to demonstrate his faith in Adams [Republican leader], meeting him and John Hume [leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party] within a week of the ceasefire for a historic public handshake aimed at consolidating the cessation”.¹⁸⁸ In October 1994, as the ceasefire continued, Loyalist paramilitary groups matched the position of the IRA: “they not only declared a ceasefire but set a new tone by including an unexpected note of apology, offering ‘the loved ones of all innocent victims over the past 25 years abject and true remorse’.”¹⁸⁹ By supporting the peace process, previously violent Loyalists strengthened the process. Instead of posing an active threat as many had anticipated, Loyalist groups promoted moderation, dialogue, and a departure from the views of “mainstream Unionist politicians”.¹⁹⁰ Daily life in

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, p.199

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p.199

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, p.200

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, p.200

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p.201

Northern Ireland improved, with “army patrols becoming less frequent and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) visibly relaxing”.¹⁹¹

In February 1995, British and Irish governments jointly published the seminal ‘framework document’, drafted by Dublin diplomat Sean O’hUiginn and presenting their collective vision.¹⁹² They “envisaged Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom, stressing the importance of Unionist consent” but “stipulated that the Irishness of Nationalists should be formally expressed through progressively increased Dublin input, most tangibly through new cross-border institutions”.¹⁹³ Unionist politicians rejected the document entirely. Nationalists were however receptive to the document, which provided the framework for subsequent negotiations.

In May 1995, Sinn Fein representatives met British ministers to expand the process: “Fits Martin McGuinness met a junior minister in Belfast, then later that month Adams met Mayhew at a conference in Washington. By that stage Adams had already shaken hands with U.S. President Bill Clinton, South African President Nelson Mandela, British ministers and almost every major political figure in the Republic”.¹⁹⁴ While British Prime Minister Major did not meet Sinn Fein, he met representatives of the parties linked to the Loyalist paramilitary groups. Loyalist parties remained active in the process and upheld the Loyalist cessation.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, p.203

¹⁹² Ibid, p.203

¹⁹³ Ibid, p.203

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p.205

Previous uncertainties about the process were unfortunately prolonged by the absence of a formal political agreement. Fragility in the process became apparent by the middle of 1995: “the IRA ceasefire was showing signs of increasing strain, with Adams and other Sinn Fein figures repeatedly warning that the peace process was in crisis”.¹⁹⁵ The Canary Wharf bombing in 1996 demonstrated that “ceasefires could be broken as easily as they were called”.¹⁹⁶ By 1996, regular acts of violence had recurred in Northern Ireland, with particularly brutal killings by Loyalists the following year.¹⁹⁷

The Breakthrough of 1997-2000

The 1997 general election that led to Tony Blair replacing John Major, as well as concurrent council elections, “transformed the peace process”, which was associated also with Britain’s “social, economic and numerical growth”.¹⁹⁸ Further, over the ensuing decades, Nationalists leveraged a potential mechanism for nonviolence and negotiation through Sinn Fein, the establishment of an inclusive peace process, and The Good Friday Agreement.¹⁹⁹

Many were motivated to vote for the first time by the 1996 disturbances at Drumcree, the marching site of the Loyalist Orange Order.²⁰⁰ Marking a major shift in political representation, Nationalists won five of Northern Ireland’s eighteen seats in the Westminster parliament in the election,

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p.205

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p.217

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p.214

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p.215

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, p.239

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p.215

including Martin McGuinness joining Gerry Adams as an MP.²⁰¹ Ascendant Nationalist voting led to Unionists losing control of four councils, which included, for the first time in history, Belfast. Sinn Fein benefitted from this emergence of Nationalist voters, many of which were likely seeking a second ceasefire from the IRA.²⁰² Despite clinging to an overall majority in Northern Ireland, the Unionist community had become more concentrated in regions around Belfast, where the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Sinn Fein predominated.²⁰³ The election of Blair afforded the Labour leader not only a large majority but also authority both inside and outside of parliament. To advance the peace process, Blair visited Belfast to re-establish direct contact between the government and Sinn Fein, and also installed Mo Mowlam, the first woman in the position of Northern Ireland Secretary, to positive effect.²⁰⁴

Initial prospects for another ceasefire were unfortunately dampened by the IRA killing of two policemen in the County Armagh town of Lurgan, near Drumcree, merely weeks before Drumcree's now annual marching confrontation. Many inferred that the IRA intended to confront Unionists rather than curtail its aggression. Persevering with the peace process, Blair and Mowlam invited Sinn Fein into negotiations without first requiring decommissioning of the IRA.²⁰⁵ In a "calculated gamble", Blair and Mowlam announced the start of political talks in Northern Ireland for September 1997, permitting Sinn Fein's participation after only a new IRA ceasefire.²⁰⁶ The government risked the Ulster Unionists departing these discussions if Sinn

²⁰¹ Ibid, p.215

²⁰² Ibid, p.215

²⁰³ Ibid, p.215

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p.216

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p.216

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p.216

Fein were admitted to them. Indeed, Paisley – a Loyalist politician and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) – along with “other hardliners” had already signaled their intent to leave if Republicans were invited.²⁰⁷

The British government's gamble paid dividends. In July, the IRA restored its ceasefire despite the controversial decision by authorities, citing Loyalist threats to Nationalists, to lock down the Nationalists' area and force the Drumcree march through the Nationalist stronghold of Garvaghy Road.²⁰⁸ That Loyalist march led to extensive protests and violence. Crucially, after extensive consideration, David Trimble kept his Ulster Unionist Party in talks with Republicans.^{209,210} However, Paisley and his associates subsequently left the negotiations, the pace of which had become sluggish.²¹¹ Arriving at Stormont in the autumn of 1997, Blair endeavoured to revitalize the process in his meetings with leaders of the parties, including Sinn Fein.²¹² His handshake with Adams was the first between a British prime minister and a Republican leader since the 1920s.²¹³

However, by the end of 1997, the death toll of 21 persons was essentially unchanged from that of the previous year. Loyalists were now responsible for two-thirds of those 1997 deaths, whereas Republicans had killed roughly two-thirds in 1996. Although the majority of the Republican and Loyalist groups respected the summer ceasefire, minor paramilitary groups opposed the peace process and remained violent, particularly at the end of 1997.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, p.216-17

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p.217

²⁰⁹ (O'Farrell, 1998), p. 101

²¹⁰ (McKittrick & McVea, 2000), p.217

²¹¹ Ibid, p.217

²¹² Ibid, p.217-18

²¹³ Ibid, p.218

Worsening violence and unprecedented movement in 1998 characterized “one of the most remarkable years of the troubles”. As Loyalist killings combined with Republican attacks, one newspaper reported: “People in Belfast now fall silent at television and radio news bulletins, waiting in dread to hear whether and where the gunmen have struck again, wondering how long the slaughter will go on at this appallingly metronomic rate. Hope remains alive for the peace process, but it takes a fresh pounding as news of each incident comes through”.²¹⁴ The RUC claimed that both the IRA and Ulster Defense Association (UDA) had been involved in the killings. Consequently, the political representatives for these two groups – Sinn Fein and the Ulster Democratic Party, respectively – were temporarily excluded from the negotiations.

Some conversations proceeded despite the disruption of this violence and these temporary expulsions. Unionists worked effectively with the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) of Northern Ireland and the Irish government. However, Unionists and Sinn Fein were unable to trust each other, and thus did not formally meet or speak to each other during the negotiations or round-table talks. Tony Blair, Bertie Ahern, George Mitchell and the others “gathered for a tense and often fraught all-night session which eventually produced, on 10 April, what came to be known as the Good Friday Agreement”. This ambitious and historic agreement sought to revise the 1920s settlement. Chief among its concepts were a “level playing field ... on which Northern Ireland politics and Anglo-Irish relations would be conducted”,

²¹⁴ Ibid, p.219

the principles of power-sharing, and the Irish dimension – all familiar from the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement.

The Good Friday Agreement took however an unprecedented step with its closely interlocking system designed to incorporate all “political relationships within Northern Ireland, between north and south and between Britain and Ireland”.²¹⁵ It addressed also “the Republican preoccupation with self-determination but crucially ... [required] that the people of Northern Ireland would decide whether it stayed with Britain or joined a united Ireland”. In rewriting Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, the accord removed “what Unionists regarded as the objectionable claim to the territory of Northern Ireland”. Moreover,

It provided for a new 108-member Belfast assembly, to which Westminster would devolve full power over areas such as education, health and agriculture, including the right to make new laws. London would retain responsibility for matters such as defense and law and order, though it promised to consider devolving security powers at a later stage.²¹⁶

The projected government would consist of a Unionist First Minister and a Nationalist Deputy First Minister, who were required to agree on important decisions. A new constitutional framework would link the Assembly with London, Dublin, Scotland and Wales. A new British-Irish council would

²¹⁵ Ibid, p.220

²¹⁶ Ibid, p.220

include representatives of both governments and the “new devolved institutions” in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Overall, Unionists and Nationalists were conferred equal “legitimacy and respect”.²¹⁷

Decommissioning of all paramilitary arms was also central to negotiations.²¹⁸

The Agreement was historic not only in its breadth but also its capacity to attract most major political stakeholders.^{219,220} While the Nationalist community was among its immediate supporters, the Ulster Unionist Party was much divided over the accord, which Paisley himself denounced. Despite the disapproval of some key members, Trimble achieved the support of his party, a major breakthrough given that a large proportion of Unionists was clearly opposed to negotiations with Nationalists.

Referendums in the north and south on the approval of the Good Friday Agreement followed in May 1998. Nationalists favoured the Agreement overwhelmingly, but the Unionist community was evenly split, with equal proportions of Unionists voting ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ in the referendum. The final tally yielded an “overwhelming endorsement in the south and a 71 per cent Yes vote in the north ... and amounted to a solid vote for the accord”.²²¹ However, that 71 per cent comprised virtually all Nationalist voters but only half of the Unionists, foreshadowing “another chapter in the familiar running battle between Unionist moderates and hardliners”.

²¹⁷ Ibid, p.221

²¹⁸ Ibid, pp.220-21

²¹⁹ (O’Farrell, 1998), p. 102

²²⁰ (McKittrick & McVea, 2000), p.221

²²¹ Ibid, p.222

Results of these referendums signaled a new era. This northern vote of 71 per cent appeared to point to the emergence of a majority that favoured a new “deal”. One newspaper highlighted the potential of the Agreement: “It offers the chance to settle agreements by argument instead of by force. It is not perfect; it will not simply dissolve away the ancient problems; it will face many hurdles and still challenges. ...”. Elections that June to the new Northern Ireland assembly yielded a “solid pro-agreement majority”. Heightened support for the SDLP and Sinn Féin²²² contrasted again with a divided Ulster Unionist Party. Although the Unionist party captured the most seats, its share of the vote fell to its lowest levels in history, with Paisley and other anti-Agreement factions trailing Trimble by only 3 per cent.²²³

Violence escalated in the summer of 1998 across Northern Ireland, beginning with the annual Orange Parade. Rather than hampering progress, these events galvanized politicians to advance the peace process.²²⁴

Recalling its members from summer recess, both the British and Irish governments responded with legislation to implement stringent new security measures. Clinton and Blair visited Omagh, the site of a major bombing that August, “meeting around 700 of the injured and relatives of the dead and injured”. In September, Trimble agreed to meet directly with Adams for the first time in history. This development suggested a new working relationship, although one characterized “by neither friendship nor trust”.²²⁵ Conferring the Nobel peace prize jointly on Hume and Trimble in the autumn signaled

²²² (O’Farrell, 1998), p.98

²²³ (McKittrick & McVea, 2000), p.223

²²⁴ Ibid, p.224

²²⁵ Ibid, pp.224-25

international aspiration for a durable peace settlement.²²⁶ By the end of 1998, “the leaders promoting peace in Northern Ireland were able to mobilize a broader level of elite consensus in support of their policies. The political environment was also calmer in Northern Ireland during this period”.²²⁷

Whether this peace process will serve the traditional Nationalist goal of Irish unity or advance an entirely new objective remains unclear. Sinn Fein has promoted “the business of ‘hollowing out’ the Union”, while the Unionist David Trimble has argued that his “approach has strengthened the bonds with Britain”.²²⁸ Similarly unclear is whether The Good Friday Agreement will accomplish its long-term aim of alleviating violent conflict and contributing to political stability.²²⁹ While Nationalists recognize The Good Friday Agreement as a historic step toward inclusivity, it is “plainly not an inclusive settlement”, since roughly half of Unionists have opposed it.²³⁰ The general election in 2001 revealed, for example, that Unionist anti-Agreement sentiment had grown, diminishing the strength of the Agreement.²³¹ Similar doubt exists regarding a new governmental system.²³² Nevertheless, recent perspectives suggest that a pathway to peace remains possible. Despite inevitable controversy, future initiatives may improve on decades of violence and turbulent conflict in Northern Ireland.²³³

²²⁶ Ibid, p.225

²²⁷ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.159

²²⁸ (McKittrick & McVea, 2000), p.239

²²⁹ Ibid, p.242

²³⁰ Ibid, p.239

²³¹ Ibid, p.239

²³² Ibid, p.242

²³³ Ibid, p.242

3.2 Orange Parades

Drumcree and the Rise of David Trimble

During the Loyalist marching season in July 1995, the RUC attempted to reroute away from a Nationalist district an Orange demonstration at Drumcree near Portadown in County Armagh, where thousands of Orangemen had congregated. The march was eventually allowed through this district, which was seen as a triumph for militant Loyalism.²³⁴ Indeed, "Paisley and the local Unionist MP, David Trimble, later celebrated the success by walking, hands joined aloft in triumph, through crowds of cheering supporters".²³⁵ To commemorate its success in "pushing the 1995 march through", the Orange Order struck 'Seige of Drumcree' medals.²³⁶ For the rest of the 1990s, the Drumcree dispute erupted annually, "often leading to large-scale disturbances and violence".²³⁷

In a toughening of Unionist power, David Trimble defeated James Molyneaux that September for the leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party, after sixteen years. At the time, Trimble, a major supporter of the Orange Order at Drumcree, had been a Member of Parliament for only five years and was "regarded as the most hardline of the five candidates for the post".²³⁸ His election indicated that Unionist party members had been pleased with

²³⁴ (Weiss, 2000), p.47

²³⁵ (McKittrick & McVea, 2000), p.205

²³⁶ Ibid, p.210

²³⁷ Ibid, p.205

²³⁸ Ibid, p.205

Trimble's part in the 1995 triumph at Drumcree.²³⁹ Trimble's emergence suggested also that the IRA ceasefire the previous year had failed to mollify Unionist attitudes: "The Protestant show of determination at Drumcree, together with Trimble's election, showed that many Unionists viewed the peace process as a hazard rather than an opportunity".²⁴⁰

Drumcree 1996

When the Drumcree parade returned in July 1996, apprehension about a major confrontation was heightened, with "the Protestant marchers ... determined to get through" and "the Catholic residents ... equally determined that they should not".²⁴¹ Academics Neil Jarman and Dominic Bryan summarized the dichotomy: "Each parade which is challenged is a symbolic threat to Protestant security and the Unionist position, while each parade which passes through a Nationalist area is a re-statement of the dominance of the Protestant community and the inferiority of Nationalist rights."²⁴²

RUC Chief Constable Sir Hugh Annesley again banned the parade from marching down the Nationalist Garvaghy Road. Orangemen attempting to do so were halted "by armoured Land Rovers, barbed wire, and RUC officers in full riot gear". Undaunted, they remained stationed near the grounds of a Drumcree church, joined by thousands of supporters including Trimble. Loyalist protesters also "engaged in vitriolic abuse of the police".²⁴³

²³⁹ Ibid, p.210

²⁴⁰ Ibid, pp.205-6

²⁴¹ Ibid, p.210

²⁴² Ibid, p.210

²⁴³ Ibid, p.210

In one of the most destabilising periods of the ‘troubles’, these conflicts engulfed much of Northern Ireland. Loyalists erected innumerable roadblocks and barricades, bringing daily life to a “standstill” and completely isolating several towns.²⁴⁴ Intimidation of police officers and their families was widespread. Burning and looting in some areas of Belfast, extensive destruction of property, and numerous injuries followed. Near Drumcree, Loyalists shot dead a Nationalist.²⁴⁵ The conflict

came to a head on the morning of the Twelfth of July when it became evident that no negotiated settlement of the dispute was in sight. A number of Loyalists appeared with a bulldozer fitted with makeshift armour, threatening to drive it through the police lines. Tens of thousands of Orangemen were poised to march in processions all over Northern Ireland, and there were not enough RUC members and troops to police them all.²⁴⁶

Given the risk of unmitigated disturbance across Northern Ireland, Annesley lifted his original ban, allowing the Orangemen along Garvaghy Road. As a consequence, Nationalist residents, many of whom had gathered in protest, had to be removed: “riot police cleared the road, with some rough-handling of residents captured in graphic detail by the television cameras”.²⁴⁷ Many Nationalists rioted; in Londonderry a man was killed. With the Orangemen completing their intended march, the “immediate threat of unrestrained civil

²⁴⁴ Ibid, p.210

²⁴⁵ Ibid, p.210

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p.211

²⁴⁷ Ibid, p.211

commotion” abated.²⁴⁸ The societal cost was however enormous. One commentator described it thusly:

The underlying instability of the state was exposed, the very fabric of society ripped and damaged, and the most fundamental questions posed about the reform-ability of Northern Ireland. The episode left community relations in tatters and left a vast new reservoir of bitterness in its wake.²⁴⁹

Despite the rancor between the two communities, its paramilitary groups refrained from “full-scale violence”. While minority subgroups on each side staged arson and other attacks, the mainstream groups avoided “uninhibited conflict”.²⁵⁰

Drumcree 1998

In July 1998, media attention shifted to renewed confrontation ahead of the Drumcree march. When authorities again prohibited the march down Garvaghy Road, Orangemen responded with disturbances – including roadblocks, protests, and rioting – throughout Northern Ireland.²⁵¹ In a single twenty-four-hour period, records revealed “384 outbreaks of disorder, 115 attacks on the security forces, 19 injuries to police, petrol bombs thrown on 96 occasions, 403 petrol bombs seized, 57 homes and businesses damaged,

²⁴⁸ Ibid, p.211

²⁴⁹ Ibid, p.211

²⁵⁰ Ibid, p.211

²⁵¹ Ibid, p.223

27 vehicles hijacked and another 89 damaged”.²⁵² In a noteworthy tragedy from one of the petrol-bombing incidents,

in the early hours of the Twelfth of July three small boys died in a fire caused by a Loyalist petrol bomb thrown into their house in the County Antrim town of Ballymoney. The Quinn children had a Catholic mother and a Protestant father. The protesters were chastened and the Drumcree disturbances quickly petered out. In the wake of the Ballymoney deaths, tensions ebbed away and a sense of confrontation was replaced by a lull.²⁵³

Both the British and Irish governments implemented stringent new security measures in response. Unexpectedly, however, a bombing in Omagh followed that August. Republican dissidents activated a car bomb in a town in the County Tyrone town, killing twenty-nine people in “possibly the worst single incident of the troubles”.²⁵⁴ A group referencing itself as ‘the Real IRA’, comprised of former IRA members opposed to the peace process, had installed this bomb.²⁵⁵ Carrying an international impact, the shock of this attack was heightened by the prevailing view at the time that the violence had been declining. Omagh’s twenty-nine fatalities nearly doubled the death toll for 1998, a notable rise over the twenty-one lost in the previous year.²⁵⁶

²⁵² Ibid, p.223

²⁵³ Ibid, p.223

²⁵⁴ Ibid, p.223

²⁵⁵ Ibid, p.223

²⁵⁶ Ibid, p.225

Drumcree 2000

In an inauspicious beginning to Drumcree's summer of 2000, the Orange Order in Portadown "called on supporters to take to streets all over Northern Ireland. Days of disruption and roadblocks followed, bringing many districts to a standstill".²⁵⁷ By the Twelfth of July, however, the Portadown Orangemen had overextended themselves. In the main, Unionist opinion did not support its disturbances, especially the refusal of Portadown Orange leader Harold Gracey to condemn violence.²⁵⁸ Unionists also distanced themselves from protests of the west Belfast UDA's "particularly militant commander, Johnny 'Mad Dog' Adair". As a consequence of these two developments, support for the disruptions receded, and, unlike in 1996 and 1998, the "protests fizzled out".²⁵⁹

3.3 Northern Ireland Conflict and The Media

As distinguished by O'Farrell, print and broadcast media covering events in Northern Ireland are either located in Northern Ireland or serve news organizations based outside Northern Ireland.²⁶⁰ These two groups may adhere to different standards of "fairness," influenced by their audience and governmental restrictions. In Belfast, three daily newspapers – the *News Letter*, the *Belfast Telegraph*, and the *Irish News* – express different political perspectives of the conflict.²⁶¹ The *News Letter* adopts a Unionist viewpoint,

²⁵⁷ Ibid, pp.228-29

²⁵⁸ Ibid, p.229

²⁵⁹ Ibid, p.229

²⁶⁰ (O'Farrell, 1998), p.97

²⁶¹ Ibid, p.97

“between the right wing of the Ulster Unionist Party and Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionists”.²⁶² In contrast, the *Telegraph* assumes a primarily liberal Unionist viewpoint but publishes opinions from across the political spectrum, from Unionist to Nationalist.²⁶³ The *Irish News* expresses a nonviolent Nationalist viewpoint, critical of IRA violence but assigning ultimate responsibility for “the woes of ‘The North’” to the Unionists and the British.²⁶⁴ Numerous local weekly newspapers also serve most towns in Northern Ireland, with at least two newspapers in each locale.²⁶⁵ Rather than educating or challenging the views of their readers, these weeklies reflect the ideologies, and prejudices, of their readership.²⁶⁶

In their coverage of conflict within Northern Ireland, journalists are generally considered to align with one side.²⁶⁷ Even the place name selected by the journalist, such as the use of an internationally accepted name, identifies the reporter’s allegiance. As well, politicians in Northern Ireland seldom endorse “original thoughts” in publications.²⁶⁸ Media expression consequently reflects the ‘other’ – “left to barren sectarian clichés, where ‘our’ side is always the innocent victim of ‘their’ crimes”.²⁶⁹

Journalists who report for media organizations that are based outside Northern Ireland adhere to a different set of rules and priorities.²⁷⁰ These reporters regard themselves as “uniquely impartial” – “outsiders” independent

²⁶² Ibid, p.97

²⁶³ Ibid, p.97

²⁶⁴ Ibid, p.97

²⁶⁵ Ibid, p.97

²⁶⁶ Ibid, p.97

²⁶⁷ Ibid, pp.96-97

²⁶⁸ Ibid, p.101

²⁶⁹ Ibid, p.101

²⁷⁰ Ibid, p.98

from national media. While their reporting may be balanced, the editorial content of these outlets lacks such fairness.²⁷¹ In this respect,

With the exception of *The Daily Mirror*, whose ‘Troops Out’ line has been blunted over recent years, every London paper has always adopted a pro-Union stance. The Republic’s papers, with the exception of the Sunday *Independent*, take a ‘soft’ Nationalist line...which holds that Irish unity can only happen with Unionist consent ... the editorial lines of papers in London and Dublin are at least subconsciously affected by the political moods around them.²⁷²

Journalists grapple with major implications in determining the “fairness” of their reporting and whether to publish. Pessimistic viewpoints may overshadow the hope that a peace settlement can be achieved.²⁷³ Publishing some factual material might derail an historic agreement between enemies.²⁷⁴ Their most difficult question might be: “Is getting one’s byline on a front page one Sunday worth bodies on the streets?”²⁷⁵ Even reporters questioning the peace process or its stakeholders have been accused of favouring a state of war.²⁷⁶ Similarly, “questioning the pervasive and intrusive security state” that persists in Northern Ireland can draw assertions that one is “soft on terrorism”, and “distancing oneself from ‘terrorism’ is a popular field sport”.²⁷⁷

²⁷¹ Ibid, p.99

²⁷² Ibid, p.99

²⁷³ Ibid, p.103

²⁷⁴ Ibid, p.103

²⁷⁵ Ibid, p.103

²⁷⁶ Ibid, p.99

²⁷⁷ Ibid, p.99

In contrast, *Fortnight*, a small independent current affairs and arts magazine, was started in 1970 specifically in response to the ‘troubles’ and the sectarian division of Northern Ireland’s print media.²⁷⁸ *Fortnight*’s work reflects all political views to directly foster debate.²⁷⁹ Indeed, at various times, the periodical has been accused of being a tool of the IRA, the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Alliance Party, the SDLP, and British Intelligence.²⁸⁰ Existing data suggest however that its readers and contributors are drawn mostly from a small leftist or liberal coterie, and that the publication’s operations are geographically limited.²⁸¹

British and Irish governments have both abnegated their responsibilities in media representation. They have promulgated “the fiction that they are honest brokers in a religious-based tribal conflict, a polite fiction whereby they depoliticize the situation”, avoided “blame for the political vacuum that encourages demagogues, and installed “themselves above the squabbling tribes”.²⁸² This “two tribes” analysis has obscured the ongoing debate within, and between, the half-dozen Unionist parties and half-dozen Nationalist political factions.²⁸³

From 1994 until 1998, statutory censorship banned Sinn Finn, the Progressive Unionists and Ulster Democrats from the airways.²⁸⁴ More recently, however, these parties have been included in traditional political debate on radio and television. Their inclusion has offset their image among

²⁷⁸ Ibid, p.99

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p.99

²⁸⁰ Ibid, pp.99-100

²⁸¹ Ibid, p.100

²⁸² Ibid, p.101

²⁸³ Ibid, p.101

²⁸⁴ Ibid, p.98

audiences as parties that “tended to demonize them as terrorist apologists”.²⁸⁵ Journalists could also not easily dismiss their views.²⁸⁶ Most political parties with parliamentary representation have tended to promote a culture of self-censorship.

²⁸⁵ Ibid, p.98
²⁸⁶ Ibid, p.98

Chapter Four – Case Study

4.0 Introduction to the Case Study

Concentrated in Northern Ireland, the Orange Order is a Protestant organization that emerged in the late eighteenth century to assert Protestant dominance during a period of conflict between sects of Protestants and Catholics.²⁸⁷ The Orange Order is aligned politically with Ulster Loyalism and conservative British Unionism. Its yearly parading season typically consists of marches between Easter Monday and mid-September, with the largest demonstration held on July 12th ('The Twelfth'). Parades have been held in Northern Ireland since the eighteenth century.²⁸⁸ Formed shortly after the Orange Order, the Royal Black Institution is a separate society composed of selected members of the Orange Order and serves the principles of the Protestant Reformation.²⁸⁹ It holds a separate parade on July 13 that is usually regarded as less fractious than those of 'The Twelfth'. The Apprentice Boys of Derry, formed in commemoration of their acts during the siege of Derry from James II, overlaps with but is not directly connected to the Orange Order.²⁹⁰

The parades in Northern Ireland have been historically contentious for Nationalist and Unionist communities.²⁹¹ The long parading season is comprised predominantly of Unionist parades, with Nationalist parades

²⁸⁷ (Bryan, 2000), p.107

²⁸⁸ Ibid, p.29

²⁸⁹ (O'Farrell, 1998), p.97

²⁹⁰ Ibid, p.97

²⁹¹ (Weiss, 2000), p.45

emerging only during the 'troubles'. Among the Unionists, the Orange Order – one of the most widespread and largest parading organizations – is responsible for the main parades on July 12th, a national holiday in Northern Ireland. Smaller regional parades also occur prior to this date. On the Second Saturday in June, the Portadown District Orangemen hold a Mini-Twelfth Parade. On the Sunday before the 12th, Boyne anniversary church services are held at different venues across Northern Ireland, along with a preliminary parade to and from the church. On the 12th of July, nineteen main parades are held at different venues across Northern Ireland and mark both the highlight of the marching season and the end of the season for the Orange Institution. The number of annual parades in Northern Ireland increased markedly in the 1990s, with 1995 seeing a total of 3,500 parades – an increase of 43 per cent from a decade earlier.²⁹² More than 80 percent of marches were Loyalist, with the remainder Nationalist.

For the Unionist community, the most important parade on July 12th commemorates the Battle of the Boyne.²⁹³ For Unionists the parades represent their cultural tradition and history, but for the Nationalist community, the parades are a public demonstration of the Unionist community's ongoing hegemony. Although Unionists do not observe their parades as primarily political, the Nationalist community sees them this way. Similarly, the Unionists see the Nationalist parades as political rather than cultural, a view which the Nationalists also dismiss.

²⁹² (Jarman, 1997), p.118

²⁹³ Ibid, p.94

While Nationalists may have attended the Unionist parades prior to the 'troubles', or at least accepted them, such tolerance has diminished over the last few decades, with the parades becoming a contentious and often violent focus for confrontation between the two communities. Although the parades and the parading routes have been defended as 'traditional', the recent increase in the number of parades suggests that they are not all so. Several areas for parades and marches are controversial, with major flashpoints including the Bogside area of London/Derry and Ormeau Road in Belfast.

The town of Portadown is a major area of violence surrounding the parades.²⁹⁴ During their parade to and from the Loyalists' Drumcree church in Portadown, members of the Orange Order have often clashed with the predominantly Nationalist residents that reside along Garvaghy Road, which the Orange Order follows upon leaving Drumcree after church services. Although Garvaghy Road attracted international attention in 1995,²⁹⁵ the area had been a site of controversy since the parades were re-routed from the Nationalist Tunnel and Obins Street in 1986. Residents of Garvaghy Road in Portadown opposed this re-routing of the Orange March down their street and formed the Garvaghy Road Residents' Association (GRRRA) to ensure that any Orange parades that intended to march along this road met their approval.

²⁹⁴ (Weiss, 2000), p.47

²⁹⁵ Ibid, p.48

Violent rioting was commonplace during parading seasons from 1995 to 1999.²⁹⁶ The 1995 parades at Drumcree, which occurred shortly after the 1994 ceasefire, brought the issue of the parades to the forefront of the conflict and continued to do so until 2000. In 1995, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) prevented the Orange Order from marching along Garvaghy Road after a service that fell on the Sunday before the 12th. A two-day standoff ensued between the RUC and the Orangemen. The event precipitated annual standoffs and protests between Unionists and Nationalists, which led to violence and increased policing throughout Northern Ireland. Violence through military organizations and weapons was chosen to express political discontent and mobilize political demands. Disputes over the Drumcree parade revealed also problems with the rule of law in Northern Ireland and the impartiality of the police force.

Major events involving the parades, which occurred annually in Portadown from 1994 until 2003, are summarized in Table 1. Analysis of photographic media coverage of the parades and the underlying conflict was carried out before, at, and following the peak of the conflict violence in the 1998 parade.

²⁹⁶ Ibid, pp.48-56

Table 1. Summary of Political Events in the Northern Ireland Peace Process and Relation to Drumcree Parades (1994–2005)

Year	Developments in Political Process	Drumcree Developments	Results
1994	<p>19th January – broadcasting ban was lifted allowing SF to access the Irish media</p> <p>August 31st – Full IRA ceasefire called</p> <p>October 13th – Full Loyalist Ceasefire</p>		
1995	<p>May 10th – First official meeting between the SF & the British Government at Stormont in 23 years</p> <p>July 27th - Gerry Adams (SF) meets with the NI Secretary of State Patrick Mayhew for official talks at Stormont</p>	<p>Drumcree I</p> <p>July 9th - RUC blocked Orange Parade down Garvaghy Road; led to stand-off, road blocks and protests by Loyalists across Northern Ireland</p> <p>David Trimble takes part in the Drumcree stand-off</p>	<p>July 11th – compromise reached allowing the parade to march down Garvaghy Road</p> <p>September 8th – David Trimble elected leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in part because of his involvement in Drumcree</p> <p>[Some suggestion that the parades became an outlet for political expression and traditional cultural grievances due to ceasefire and the inability to forge paramilitary violence]</p>
1996	<p>February 9th – End of the IRA ceasefire after the IRA detonate a bomb in Canary Wharf, London</p> <p>British & Irish leaders announce date of June 10th for all-party talks</p> <p>April 28th – IRA must restore ceasefire before SF can join all-party talks</p>	<p>Drumcree II</p> <p>July 7th – RUC prevents Portadown Orange march from going down Garvaghy Road starting protests and roadblocks all over NI</p>	<p>This parade led to even more widespread rioting throughout Northern Ireland with over 10 000 Loyalist protesters and policing costs rising to a record 200 million</p>

	<p>June 10th – All-party negotiations begin at Stormont excluding SF</p> <p>June 15th – IRA exploded bomb in Manchester injuring 200 people</p> <p>July 13th – IRA bomb in Enniskillen</p> <p>October 7th – IRA bombs the British Army Headquarters in County Antrim</p>		
1997	<p>January 29th – Call for an Independent Parades Commission to be set up</p> <p>February 12th – IRA shot dead a British soldier at a check point in County Armagh</p> <p>May 1st – Labour Party and Tony Blair elected with Mo Mowlam appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland</p> <p>May 16th – Tony Blair agrees to exploratory talks between government and SF</p> <p>June 16th – IRA shoot two RUC officers in County Armagh; Tony Blair bans further talk between government and SF</p> <p>July 20th – Gerry Adams (SF) gets IRA to declare a renewal of the ceasefire</p> <p>August 26th – the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) was established to oversee paramilitary decommissioning</p> <p>August 29th – Mo Mowlam announces that SF can join</p>	<p>Drumcree III</p> <p>July 6th – violence in Portadown which spread to other Nationalist areas after the RUC sealed off the Garvaghy Road to allow the Orange march to proceed</p>	

	<p>all-party talks</p> <p>September 9th – SF enters the multi-party talks at Stormont; DUP boycotts the talks</p> <p>October 13th – Tony Blair meets Gerry Adams & Martin McGuinness for the first time</p>		
1998	<p>March 26th – independent chairman of the multi-party talks, sets April 9th deadline for the talks</p> <p>April 10th – Good Friday Agreement is signed by all the parties and talks are brought to an end</p> <p>May 22nd – referendums on the Agreement in Northern Ireland and the Republic lead to its endorsement</p>	<p>Drumcree IV</p> <p>First year that the Parades Commission is set up to make decisions</p> <p>No local decision between communities</p> <p>Sunday July 5th parade was re-routed</p> <p>Orange Order (OO) announces that it will march 'traditional' route and ignore decision and stand ground it confronted for as long as necessary</p> <p>From July 3rd to 4th 1000 British troops and 1000 RUC officers were deployed in Drumcree; a barricade was erected and a trench laid with barbed wire was built between Drumcree Church and Garvaghy Road</p> <p>On Sunday the 5th OO marched to barricade then returned to church for a 'stand-off'</p>	<p>Rioting in number of Unionist areas of Northern Ireland and blocked roads throughout</p> <p>OO decides to continue token demonstration and stand-off until allowed to march down Garvaghy Road which continued until July 1999</p> <p>No resolution found</p> <p>Widespread violence across Northern Ireland</p> <p>Between July 4th and July 14th 1998:</p> <p>2561 public order incidents; 144 houses damaged; 76 police officers injured 632 petrol bombs thrown; 2250 petrol bombs recovered</p> <p>Nationalist homes attacked by petrol bombs</p> <p>Large numbers of illegal parades</p> <p>Violence intensified over the 12th weekend with Paisley saying it would be "settling day"</p>

			<p>Sunday July 12th 1998, Nationalist Quinn family home petrol-bombed and three young boys are killed</p> <p>RUC begins search operation at Drumcree and recovers mass of weapons</p> <p>OO numbers have decreased considerably</p>
1999	<p>December 2nd – Unionists enter into an executive with SF and devolution of powers from Westminster to Stormont</p>	<p>Drumcree V</p> <p>In the absence of local agreement on the parades, the Parades Commission ruled that the parade would be re-routed;</p> <p>The protests from Drumcree 1998 continued until July 1999 and throughout there were scores of marches and parades in Portadown and the rest of Northern Ireland for the OO</p> <p>RUC erected a fifteen ft steel barricade, razor barbed wire and a moat between the police and the protesters; 1300 Orangemen marched and met up with several thousand supporters at Drumcree;</p> <p>After church, six members marched to the police barricade and delivered a letter to the RUC in protest and then retreated to a rally</p> <p>The rally was addressed by Harold Gracey (District O Master) who asked for peaceful protest</p>	<p>High level of intimidation and attacks on Nationalist families in the region</p> <p>July 4th Parade was relatively peaceful with only a few violent episodes in Portadown and Ballymena</p>

2000	<p>February 11th – Suspension of Stormont executive and reinstatement of ‘direct rule’ from Westminster because of a lack of progress on IRA decommissioning</p> <p>May 29th – Institutions and Executive were reinstated</p>	<p>The ‘traditional date’ for the Drumcree parade was July 9th, but an additional parade was added on July 2nd, perhaps to heighten tension for the Twelfth; parades commission rules that it would be re-routed from Drumcree</p> <p>July 9th Drumcree parade was also re-routed from the Garvaghy Road</p>	Violent protests in Portadown and Drumcree following the July 2 nd parade; roads were blocked in towns across Northern Ireland
2001	<p>August 10th & September 21st – short tactical suspensions of Stormont for 24-hour periods</p> <p>October 23rd – IRA entered into discussions with the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD)</p>		
2002	October 14 th – Indefinite period of suspension of Stormont begins		
2003	No major events		
2004	No major events		
2005	September 26 th – IICD reports that the IRA had decommissioned all its weapons. Unionists still refuse to enter into a power-sharing Executive and at the beginning of 2006 the devolved institutions remain suspended		

4.1 Hypothesis

Across the period of 1996 to 2000, the content of newspaper images from democratic countries regarding the annual July 12th Drumcree parades in Portadown, Northern Ireland does not vary according to level of violence in the Northern Ireland conflict and lacks depictions of peace-building and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Central to this hypothesis is the study 'main unit': During parades associated with national violence in Northern Ireland, as compared to periods of relative peace, what are the dominant images issued by major newspapers depicting the 'other' and representing the conflict?

4.2 Methodology, Source Selection, and Data Collection

This case study evaluates the content of the images published in major newsprint media to capture the events of the July 12th parades in Portadown, Northern Ireland and the subsequent church services, in July 1996, July 1998, and July 2000 – the 'sample unit' of this study. To examine potential relationships between sampled photographic content and differing events in the conflict and peace process in Northern Ireland – including differences in acts of violence and aggression – the study selected images from the years 1996, 1998, and 2000 for analysis. Assessment of content follows recognized methods for quantitative visual analysis that are outlined in *The SAGE Handbook of Visual Research Methods*.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁷ (Margolis, Pauwels, & Sage Publications., 2011), pp.265-282

This paper posits that Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Britain are partners in the conflict and in the peace process. Accordingly, print newspapers from each of these countries are reviewed. In addition, the range of newspapers examined will differ in political perspective (i.e., left, central and right) and type of publication (tabloid or broadsheet). In the case of the newspapers surveyed in Northern Ireland, local circulation papers and two defined partisan papers (Nationalist and Unionist) were considered. The major reasons for including diverse sources are, first, to examine how the conflict is covered using news photographs by a broad cross-section of the press and, second, to examine if differences exist in the selection or use of these photographs across these news organizations. Newspapers were restricted to English-language printed publications; content from online sources, if available, did not add significantly to available material during the study period. After screening candidate newspapers, the following print newspapers were included for analysis of photographic material:

- **Northern Ireland:** (1) *The Irish News*; (2) *The Belfast Telegraph*; (3) *The Portadown Times*
- **Republic of Ireland:** (4) *The Irish Times*; (5) *The Irish Independent*
- **Britain (outside Northern Ireland):** (6) *The Times*

Newspapers were selected according to their varying geographic and ideological features, with sources from each of Northern Ireland, the Republic

of Ireland, and Britain. Newspapers were analyzed during the following periods: July 1 to 31, 1996; July 1 to 31, 1998; and July 1 to 31, 2000.

Photographs included in the study were restricted to images that related directly to the Portadown parades or Drumcree and that related only to the 'Twelfth' proceedings. Images from parades at other locations or specific to other normal parade dates, services, or towns were excluded. Reprinted photographs, retrospective or summative coverage photos, or photos surveying the news coverage from other newspapers were also not retrieved. The format was any of original print, electronic storage (e.g., scanned images), or microfilm.

Each newspaper was reviewed systematically for images related to or accompanied by written material on Portadown or Drumcree. Images were characterized based on their primary content, assigning one dominant theme to the content of each image. Each image was categorized into one of the following dominant or salient themes: Direct Confrontation; Police/Authority/Barriers; Visible Violence/Results of Violent Acts; Pictures of 'Victims'; Mass of Protesters; Marching; Portraits of Major Players; Signs/Symbols/Maps Related to Conflict; Comic Illustration of Conflict; and Peacemaking/Portraits Depicting Peace. These themes were selected and defined to allow for subsequent grouping into subject matter that was regarded as either predominantly violent or aggressive, neutral, or peaceful, with the latter consistent with Galtung's definition.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁸ (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.112

Dominant theme was coded according to pre-defined characteristics that could be identified from any news image, while minimizing overlap between such characteristics. 'Direct confrontation' depicts opposing groups in a confrontation during a parade, march, or protest that raises the potential for violence or aggression, with at least two groups represented predominantly by their members and/or an opposing physical barrier that manifestly impedes one group (e.g., one group impeded from forward progress by lines of police). 'Police / Authority / Barriers' is a deterrent and single-group portrayal of police or policing, officers, or authority figures on either side of the conflict, depictions of physical barriers to demonstrations (e.g., barricades), or potential threats of physical conflict or implied aggression. Violent or aggressive material comprises direct or imminent physical contact, arms or use of arms, rioting, consequences of violence (e.g., damage to property, loss of life), or direct risk to safety or well being of any persons (e.g., burning a church). 'Victims' refers to a portrayal of one or more persons who have been previously adversely affected by the conflict or violence. 'Mass of Protesters' is characterized by an assembly of protesters without an equivalent depiction of an opposing group in the scene. 'Marching' is an image depicting movement of one or more persons participating directly in the marching aspect of the parade or a related procession, or the supporters of those marching. 'Major players' refers to a portrait or non-aggressive depiction of leaders, stakeholders or key figures in the Northern Ireland conflict. 'Signs/symbols' is any inanimate representation of the conflict, such as a mural, poster, protest signage, or logo, which does not contain or reflect an unambiguously peaceful message.

'Peacemaking/Portraits Depicting Peace' refers to all forms of imagery that illustrate or reflect conciliation, mediation, dialogue to foster conflict resolution or the peace process, expression or promotion of peace-building, consensus-building, fostering pro-social or friendly relationships, portraits of peacemakers or peaceful themes, non-photographic images or drawings with peaceful messages, or serving as a peaceful witness. It includes also portraits of persons not associated with aggressive roles who are undertaking activities of daily life (e.g., pastor preparing for a service, residents distributing food supplies).

4.3 Data Analysis

To distinguish their content for analysis, images were assigned systematically to one of the following three thematic domains: (1) Acts of Physical Violence/Aggression; (2) Non-Violent and Non-Peaceful Actions; and (3) Peacemaking/Peaceful Actions. The Violence/Aggression domain encompasses the following image themes: Direct Confrontation; Police / Authority / Barriers; Visible Violence/Results of Violent Acts; and Pictures of 'Victims'. The Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful domain, which captured non-violent actions that were also not intended to promote peaceful relations, includes these themes: Mass of Protesters; Marching; Portraits of Major Players; Signs/Symbols/Maps Related to Conflict; and Comic Illustration. Peacemaking/Peaceful Actions encompasses the final theme of Peacemaking/Portraits Depicting Peace.

The absolute and relative frequencies of these three content groups were then tabulated, and compared across the three years of study and publications. In assessing trends of content, study periods in 1996 and 1998 were taken as violent periods, while the 2000 period was regarded as relatively peaceful. Based on the previously reviewed literature and previously tabulated events, 1998 including July 1998 was considered to be more objectively violent than 1996 including July 1996.

Chapter Five – Results and Findings

5.1 Results from Case Study

The volume of selected images (total, 284) was equal in 1996 (114 images) and 1998 (114 images), diminishing in the more peaceful year of 2000 (56 images). Led by *The Irish News* and *The Portadown Times*, newspapers in Northern Ireland published more photographs (214) than all other papers (Table 2 – Appendix and Table 3). Images characterized as violent/aggressive (V/A) or non-violent/non-peaceful (NV/NP) predominated in all years of the study in all publications.

In the Northern Ireland newspapers, the proportion of V/A material was higher in 1996 than in 1998, while the opposite was apparent in the Irish and British publications (Table 4). No overall difference in the publication rate of V/A material was evident consistently between 1996 and 1998. Decreases in V/A material in the Northern Ireland publications from 1996 to 1998 were associated with commensurate increases in their NV/NP content. In most newspapers, the proportions of both V/A (Table 4) and NV/NP content (Table 5) were higher in the relatively peaceful period of 2000 than their proportions in at least one of the other ‘violent’ years of 1996 and 1998. No overall trend was observed in relation to the level of violence across 1996 to 2000.

Portrayal of any peacemaking or peaceful (P/P) content in newspaper images was extremely limited (Table 6). Such content did not vary over time

or according to the level of violence. In four of the six newspapers – one of the Northern Ireland newspapers, both Irish papers, and *The Times* – no such images appeared in any years. In the remaining two Northern Ireland publications, the proportion of P/P content was somewhat higher in 1998 than in 1996, and such material was virtually absent in 2000. The largest proportion achieved at any point, by the Portadown Times in 1998, was 17%.

Table 3. Summary of Type of Content of Newspaper Images for July Portadown parades in 1996, 1998, and 2000

Northern Ireland

1. The Irish News

Year	Type of Image	Number (Count)
1996	Direct Confrontation	4
1996	Police/Authority/Barriers	2
1996	Visible Violence/Results	4
1996	Pictures of 'Victims'	1
1996	Mass of Protesters	1
1996	Marching	3
1996	Portraits of Major Players	5
1996	Comic	1
1996	Signs/Symbols/Maps	1
1996	Peacemaking/Portraits	3
Total – July 1996		25
		Violence/Aggression: 11/25 (44%)
		Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 11/25 (44%)
		Peacemaking/Peaceful: 3/25 (12%)
1998	Direct Confrontation	4
1998	Police/Authority/Barriers	0
1998	Visible Violence/Results	0
1998	Pictures of 'Victims'	2
1998	Mass/Protesters	1
1998	Marching	0
1998	Portraits of Major Players	4
1998	Comic	1
1998	Signs/Symbols/Maps	7
1998	Peacemaking/Portraits	3
Total – July 1998		22
		Violence/Aggression: 6/22 (27%)
		Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 13/22 (59%)
		Peacemaking/Peaceful: 3/22 (14%)
2000	Direct Confrontation	1
2000	Police/Authority/Barriers	2
2000	Visible Violence/Results	1
2000	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
2000	Mass/Protesters	2

2000	Marching	0
2000	Portraits of Major Players	4
2000	Comic	2
2000	Signs/Symbols/Maps	0
2000	Peacemaking/Portraits	0
Total – July 2000		12
		Violence/Aggression: 4/12 (33%)
		Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 8/12 (67%)
		Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/12 (0%)

2. The Belfast Telegraph

Year	Type of Image	Number
1996	Direct Confrontation	4
1996	Police/Authority/Barriers	2
1996	Visible Violence/Results	3
1996	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
1996	Mass/Protesters	2
1996	Marching	4
1996	Portraits of Major Players	1
1996	Comic	0
1996	Signs/Symbols/Maps	0
1996	Peacemaking/Portraits	0
Total – July 1996		16
		Violence/Aggression: 9/16 (56%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 7/16 (44%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/16 (0%)
1998	Direct Confrontation	0
1998	Police/Authority/Barriers	1
1998	Visible Violence/Results	0
1998	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
1998	Mass/Protesters	3
1998	Marching	0
1998	Portraits of Major Players	1
1998	Comic	0
1998	Signs/Symbols/Maps	1
1998	Peacemaking/Portraits	0
Total – July 1998		6
		Violence/Aggression: 1/6 (17%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 5/6 (83%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/6 (0%)
2000	Direct Confrontation	2
2000	Police/Authority/Barriers	1
2000	Visible Violence/Results	0
2000	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
2000	Mass/Protesters	2
2000	Marching	0
2000	Portraits of Major Players	2
2000	Comic	0
2000	Signs/Symbols/Maps	0
2000	Peacemaking/Portraits	0

Total – July 2000		7
		Violence/Aggression: 3/7 (43%)
		Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 4/7 (57%)
		Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%)

3. The Portadown Times

Year	Type of Image	Number
1996	Direct Confrontation	4
1996	Police/Authority/Barriers	3
1996	Visible Violence/Results	9
1996	Pictures of 'Victims'	4
1996	Mass/Protesters	2
1996	Marching	7
1996	Portraits of Major Players	5
1996	Comic	0
1996	Signs/Symbols/Maps	1
1996	Peacemaking/Portraits	3
Total – July 1996		38
		Violence/Aggression: 20/38 (53%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 15/38 (39%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 3/38 (8%)
1998	Direct Confrontation	2
1998	Police/Authority/Barriers	16
1998	Visible Violence/Results	5
1998	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
1998	Mass/Protesters	4
1998	Marching	6
1998	Portraits of Major Players	17
1998	Comic	0
1998	Signs/Symbols/Maps	4
1998	Peacemaking/Portraits	11
Total – July 1998		65
		Violence/Aggression: 23/65 (35%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 31/65 (48%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 11/65 (17%)
2000	Direct Confrontation	0
2000	Police/Authority/Barriers	4
2000	Visible Violence/Results	3
2000	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
2000	Mass/Protesters	2
2000	Marching	2
2000	Portraits of Major Players	7
2000	Comic	0
2000	Signs/Symbols/Maps	4
2000	Peacemaking/Portraits	1

Total – July 2000		23
		Violence/Aggression: 7/23 (31%)
		Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 15/23 (65%)
		Peacemaking/Peaceful: 1/23 (4%)

Republic of Ireland

4. The Irish Times

Year	Type of Image	Number
1996	Direct Confrontation	2
1996	Police/Authority/Barriers	0
1996	Visible Violence/Results	3
1996	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
1996	Mass/Protesters	2
1996	Marching	1
1996	Portraits of Major Players	5
1996	Comic	1
1996	Signs/Symbols/Maps	3
1996	Peacemaking/Portraits	0
Total – July 1996		17
		Violence/Aggression: 5/17 (29%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 12/17 (71%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/17 (0%)
1998	Direct Confrontation	2
1998	Police/Authority/Barriers	0
1998	Visible Violence/Results	3
1998	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
1998	Mass/Protesters	0
1998	Marching	0
1998	Portraits of Major Players	1
1998	Comic	0
1998	Signs/Symbols/Maps	1
1998	Peacemaking/Portraits	0
Total – July 1998		7
		Violence/Aggression: 5/7 (71%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 2/7 (29%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%)
2000	Direct Confrontation	0
2000	Police/Authority/Barriers	2
2000	Visible Violence/Results	2
2000	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
2000	Mass/Protesters	0
2000	Marching	0
2000	Portraits of Major Players	2
2000	Comic	0
2000	Signs/Symbols/Maps	1
2000	Peacemaking/Portraits	0

Total – July 2000		7
		Violence/Aggression: 4/7 (57%)
		Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 3/7 (43%)
		Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%)

5. The Irish Independent

Year	Type of Image	Number
1996	Direct Confrontation	3
1996	Police/Authority/Barriers	0
1996	Visible Violence/Results	4
1996	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
1996	Mass/Protesters	0
1996	Marching	2
1996	Portraits of Major Players	5
1996	Comic	0
1996	Signs/Symbols/Maps	0
1996	Peacemaking/Portraits	0
Total – July 1996		14
		Violence/Aggression: 7/14 (50%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 7/14 (50%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/14 (0%)
1998	Direct Confrontation	2
1998	Police/Authority/Barriers	3
1998	Visible Violence/Results	1
1998	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
1998	Mass/Protesters	0
1998	Marching	0
1998	Portraits of Major Players	1
1998	Comic	0
1998	Signs/Symbols/Maps	0
1998	Peacemaking/Portraits	0
Total – July 1998		7
		Violence/Aggression: 6/7 (86%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 1/7 (14%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%)
2000	Direct Confrontation	1
2000	Police/Authority/Barriers	2
2000	Visible Violence/Results	0
2000	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
2000	Mass/Protesters	0
2000	Marching	0
2000	Portraits of Major Players	1
2000	Comic	0
2000	Signs/Symbols/Maps	0
2000	Peacemaking/Portraits	0

Total – July 2000		4
		Violence/Aggression: 3/4 (75%)
		Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 1/4 (25%)
		Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/4 (0%)

Britain (outside Northern Ireland)

6. The Times

Year	Type of Image	Number (Count)
1996	Direct Confrontation	1
1996	Police/Authority/Barriers	0
1996	Visible Violence/Results	2
1996	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
1996	Mass/Protesters	0
1996	Marching	0
1996	Portraits of Major Players	1
1996	Comic	0
1996	Signs/Symbols/Maps	0
1996	Peacemaking/Portraits	0
Total – July 1996		4
		Violence/Aggression: 3/4 (75%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 1/4 (25%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/4 (0%)
1998	Direct Confrontation	0
1998	Police/Authority/Barriers	3
1998	Visible Violence/Results	1
1998	Pictures of 'Victims'	1
1998	Mass/Protesters	0
1998	Marching	0
1998	Portraits of Major Players	1
1998	Comic	0
1998	Signs/Symbols/Maps	1
1998	Peacemaking/Portraits	0
Total – July 1998		7
		Violence/Aggression: 5/7 (71%) Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 2/7 (29%) Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%)
2000	Direct Confrontation	0
2000	Police/Authority/Barriers	0
2000	Visible Violence/Results	0
2000	Pictures of 'Victims'	0
2000	Mass/Protesters	0
2000	Marching	0
2000	Portraits of Major Players	2
2000	Comic	1
2000	Signs/Symbols/Maps	0
2000	Peacemaking/Portraits	0

Total – July 2000		3
		Violence/Aggression: 0/3 (0%)
		Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 3/3 (100%)
		Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/3 (0%)

Table 4. Proportion of Images of Violence / Aggression

Publication	1996	1998	2000
The Irish News	11/25 (44%)	6/22 (27%)	4/12 (33%)
The Belfast Telegraph	9/16 (56%)	1/6 (17%)	3/7 (43%)
The Portadown Times	20/38 (53%)	23/65 (35%)	7/23 (31%)
The Irish Times	5/17 (29%)	5/7 (71%)	4/7 (57%)
The Irish Independent	7/14 (50%)	6/7 (86%)	3/4 (75%)
The Times (Brit)	3/4 (75%)	5/7 (71%)	0/3 (0%)

Table 5. Proportion of Images with Non-Violent / Non-Peaceful Content

Publication	1996	1998	2000
The Irish News	11/25 (44%)	13/22 (59%)	8/12 (67%)
The Belfast Telegraph	7/16 (44%)	5/6 (83%)	4/7 (57%)
The Portadown Times	15/38 (39%)	31/65 (48%)	15/23 (65%)
The Irish Times	12/17 (71%)	2/7 (29%)	3/7 (43%)
The Irish Independent	7/14 (50%)	1/7 (14%)	1/4 (25%)
The Times (Brit)	1/4 (25%)	2/7 (29%)	3/3 (100%)

Table 6. Proportion of Images with Peacemaking / Peaceful Content

Publication	1996	1998	2000
The Irish News	3/25 (12%)	3/22 (14%)	0/12 (0%)
The Belfast Telegraph	0/16 (0%)	0/6 (0%)	0/7 (0%)
The Portadown Times	3/38 (8%)	11/65 (17%)	1/23 (4%)
The Irish Times	0/17 (0%)	0/7 (0%)	0/7 (0%)
The Irish Independent	0/14 (0%)	0/7 (0%)	0/4 (0%)
The Times (Brit)	0/4 (0%)	0/7 (0%)	0/3 (0%)

5.2 Findings and Importance

During the violent periods in Northern Ireland of 1996 and 1998, newspapers published an overall large volume and a dominant proportion of images depicting physical violence, aggression, threatened aggression, and non-peaceful responses to conflict. In contrast, during the relatively peaceful demonstrations of the summer of 2000, no newspapers published any images with peaceful content. In 1996 and 1998, only two newspapers published any images depicting peaceful themes, in low proportions and low overall volume compared to their other content in those years.

From 1996/1998 to the relatively peaceful period in 2000, images with peacemaking or peace building content completely disappeared from publication, while the proportion of images reflecting violent and other themes did not materially change. Of note, in 2000, several outlets did not even publish any images on 12th or 13th of July, or published very few photographs on those specific dates, in marked contrast to their output during the corresponding dates in 1996 and 1998, which were characterized by violence.

In this cross-sectional multi-year study, consistent with the hypothesis, no correlation was observed between the content of published images and the level of violence or relative peace across the years of study of the Drumcree parades in Portadown, Northern Ireland. Of chief importance, peaceful

content did not appear during the most peaceful period of the study and was also overall poorly represented in all other years.

5.3 Discussion

Wolfsfeld has noted that no major studies have examined the role of the news media in an ongoing peace process.²⁹⁹ Similarly, none have evaluated the role of photography in news media coverage of peace. Relatively autonomous news media have nevertheless the potential to exert influence on a peace process.³⁰⁰ In particular, journalists' selection of sources and their emphasis on specific narratives, individual events, or conflictual aspects can significantly affect the interpretation of a peace process.^{301,302} In fact, "some of the most important effects of the media on the prospects for peace take place long before the negotiations begin".³⁰³ In the present work, however, the media do not appear to have selected any peace narrative.

The paucity of images that reflect a peace narrative identified in this work, despite political changes supporting a peace process during the study period, suggests that the press does not emphasize or engage its audience in the peace process through its use of imagery. Traditional values of the news media – immediacy, drama, simplicity, and ethnocentrism – shape "what is and is not considered news" and may impede the coverage of a peace

²⁹⁹ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.8

³⁰⁰ Ibid, p.10

³⁰¹ Ibid, p.12

³⁰² (Sparre, 2001), p.90

³⁰³ Ibid, p.23

process.³⁰⁴ In fact, as reported by Wolfsfeld, “a fundamental contradiction between the nature of a peace process and news values” contributes to the press assuming “a destructive role in attempts at making peace”.³⁰⁵ The absence of photography aimed at peace building and at bringing agency to depictions of peace directly facilitates this deleterious role.

Although political changes may precede changes in media coverage, such as a shift to “Pro-Peace frames”³⁰⁶ in text reports and editorials,³⁰⁷ the present work did find such an adoption of Pro-Peace coverage to be reflected in the press photography during the period of political changes concurrent with this study. Despite peaceful developments and diminished aggression in Northern Ireland in 2000, the press neglected to report or explore such events, at least in its photography, while accentuating aggression in earlier years. This work parallels prior observations made about textual media and news stories: “[the media] devote almost all of their attention to confrontation and violence and mostly ignore areas of cooperation and reconciliation”.³⁰⁸

In general, news media can impact a peace process through four mechanisms: defining the political atmosphere; influencing the nature of the debate; affecting the strategy and behaviour of antagonists; and raising or lowering the public standing and legitimacy of antagonists in the peace process.³⁰⁹ Focus on a “calm political environment” is paramount to the

³⁰⁴ Ibid, p.15

³⁰⁵ Ibid, p.15

³⁰⁶ Ibid, p.163

³⁰⁷ Ibid, p.164

³⁰⁸ Ibid, p.24

³⁰⁹ Ibid, p.11

promotion of peace.³¹⁰ Further, “by modifying images of the enemy, the press can play just as important a role in mobilizing the public for peace as it does for war”, as well as “soften[ing] images of the enemy”.³¹¹ Similarly, the “portrayal of proponents and opponents to a peace process” impact the level of public support for each political stakeholder.³¹² As the media tend to cover personalities rather than institutions,³¹³ the opportunity exists for portrayals of individuals contributing to peace motives. Through images as well as text, “the more knowledge and awareness citizens have of these problems, the more they can become critical consumers of news”.³¹⁴

As suggested by Schwartz,³¹⁵ our individual and collective choices “[shape] the final printed photograph”, which at first seems to be primarily influenced by “the agency and the intent of the photographer”. Sontag agreed in part: “it is always the image that someone chose; to photograph is to frame, and to frame is to exclude”.³¹⁶ However, Sontag posits that a photograph’s “moral and emotional weight depends on where it is inserted”, its meaning changing “according to the context in which it is seen...”.³¹⁷ In *Regarding the Pain of Others*,³¹⁸ she argues also that “the photographer’s intentions do not determine the meaning of the photograph, which will have its own career, blown by the whims and loyalties of the diverse communities that have use for it”. Further, Sontag characterized the photograph as “always an object in

³¹⁰ Ibid, p.20

³¹¹ Ibid, p.14

³¹² Ibid, p.14

³¹³ Ibid, p.20

³¹⁴ Ibid, p.22

³¹⁵ (Schwartz, 1992), p.96

³¹⁶ (Sontag, 2003), p.46

³¹⁷ (Sontag, 1990), p.105-6

³¹⁸ (Sontag, 2003), p.39

a context”, which is apt to change.³¹⁹ The transience of that context suggests that certain images, even if non-peaceful in the short-term, carry potentially constructive long-term value: “the context which shapes whatever immediate – in particular, political – uses the photograph may have is inevitably succeeded by contexts in which such uses are weakened and become progressively less relevant”.³²⁰ In particular, the social context that gave rise to an image may be at variance with the social relationships within which the image is embedded at any given time that the image is viewed.

Photojournalists value the “emotional impact” of photographs in spot news assignments.³²¹ Indeed, photographers tend to “concentrate on the human element of any tragedy”.³²² However, the durable value of such ‘emotional’ imagery, or the horrifying photo, is markedly limited. Photographs “shock insofar as they show something novel. Unfortunately, the ante keeps getting raised – partly through the very proliferation of such images of horror”.³²³ Indeed, while “photographs can distress”, “the aestheticizing tendency of photography is such that the medium which conveys distress ends by neutralizing it”.³²⁴

Violent media images also carry implications for future acts of violence and public policy, acting as agents that, at the very least, accelerate political changes in society.³²⁵ The influence of media accounts dictating policy was apparent in the Bosnian War: “when Bosnian Serbs fired a single mortar shell

³¹⁹ (Sontag, 1990), p.106

³²⁰ Ibid, p. 106

³²¹ (Schwartz, 1992), p.100

³²² Ibid, p.100

³²³ (Sontag, 1990), p.19

³²⁴ Ibid, p.109-10

³²⁵ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.29

into a Sarajevo bread queue, in local terms it was not an especially shocking atrocity. It was the fact that it was captured on film that made the difference, and prompted a threat of military action by NATO”.³²⁶ Indeed, “living with the photographed images of suffering ... does not necessarily strengthen conscience and the ability to be compassionate. It can also corrupt them”.³²⁷ McGoldrick and Lynch explain that the defining aspects of War Journalism “lead us ... to overvalue violent, reactive responses to conflict, and undervalue non-violent, development ones”.³²⁸ With the latter, photographs representing peace may avoid or even reverse this pattern, taking an alternate route to “the road of seeing more – and more” images of suffering.³²⁹ A seminal example of a peace photograph can be found on the front page of *The Belfast Telegraph* on April 11, 1998: “a rather large and moving picture of two women – one Protestant and one Catholic – praying at the respective churches ... [with a] caption that reads ‘United in Prayer for Peace’”.³³⁰

While coverage of conflict is “replete with striking, dramatic images” and “exciting”, the “role of the news media in a peace process ... is usually more hidden and subtle” and “complicated”.³³¹ Political waves, which are “sudden and significant changes in the political environment ... characterized by a substantial increase in ... public attention centered on a political issue or event”, are commonplace after violence or aggression.³³² Press amplification of such waves may not occur or be as apparent in the coverage of a peace

³²⁶ (Allen & Seaton, 1999), p.39

³²⁷ (Sontag, 1990), p.19

³²⁸ (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005), p.197

³²⁹ (Sontag, 1990), p.20

³³⁰ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.168

³³¹ Ibid, p.9

³³² Ibid, p.32

process. Photographs representing peace building may not “operate at the [same] level of emotional response” as those that exemplify conflict. This obstacle may be a further reason for which peace photographs, opportunities for which are already relegated to general news assignments, are so limited.

As well, media frames are important in providing “an interpretive theme that govern the collection of information and the construction of new stories”.³³³

The “narrative frame” deployed in most news events emphasizes the “starring actors” while “masking complexity and diffusing critical response”,³³⁴ limiting the opportunity to understand the important “Peace frame” underlying negotiations.³³⁵ While involved journalists may not be documenting violence because it has indeed abated, the lack of photographs depicting violence does not necessarily convey the presence of peace. Moreover, journalists need to better identify and capture images that reflect peaceful circumstances or a negotiation process: the media instead perceives the lack of dramatic, physical events as an absence of ‘things happening’ – or events worth photographing. Seeing the image of peace as a ‘thing happening’, an *objet trouvé*, will be transformative.

Peace content in photojournalism may also be limited by the self-perceptions of journalists. Media outlets and journalists “do not generally examine the assumptions underlying [their] decisions” in producing content, “their impact in shaping public understanding”, or “their influence over the actions and

³³³ Ibid, p.36

³³⁴ (Schwartz, 1992), p.108

³³⁵ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.37

motivations of parties to the conflict”.³³⁶ Journalists act instead as “gatekeepers” in news coverage, and how they decide on material for publication reflects their values and the criteria for publication of images and other content.³³⁷ In some instances, news media are more likely to assume a “negative role in the [peace] process” in the context of an increasing number and severity of crises during that process.³³⁸

Therefore, as an alternate approach, I propose that Peace Photojournalism can both communicate and shape a peaceful dialogue in increments over an extended time frame. At variance with Sontag, who believed that photography is “an act of non-intervention”,³³⁹ Peace Photojournalism can advance peaceful actions and solutions to conflict, and like Peace Journalism, may “build an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting”.³⁴⁰ Wolfsfeld posits that “changes in coverage have the potential of making a positive contribution to the promotion of peace” and that “changes in setting, stories, emotional tone, and language may very well serve to reduce tensions between the antagonists”.³⁴¹ Similar changes in accompanying photographic coverage of peace and conflict could be similarly constructive.

Strobel provides case examples that “the media *can* exert influence on policy regarding peace operations”, and the numerous factors that determine

³³⁶ (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005), p.196

³³⁷ Ibid, p.196

³³⁸ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.30

³³⁹ (Sontag, 1990), p.6

³⁴⁰ (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005), p.5

³⁴¹ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.35

whether they do “are within government officials’ power to control”.³⁴² The characteristics of peace operations, the nature of military missions, and, to a lesser degree, the capabilities of the press all influence such responses by officials and the role of news media.³⁴³ Further, “if properly understood and utilized, the very news media that at times seem to be the enemy of peace operations can help increase public understanding for an operation before and during its execution”.³⁴⁴ Crucially, since peace operations are generally “transparent”, “the instruments of communication become integral to their failure or success”, which depends also on “local consensus and domestic support for the mission”.³⁴⁵ Through political waves, the press can help garner support for a peace process by covering a “major breakthrough in negotiations”, conferring also to government “political and media advantages”.³⁴⁶

³⁴² (Strobel, 1997), p.211

³⁴³ Ibid, p.212-13

³⁴⁴ Ibid, p.213

³⁴⁵ Ibid, p.225

³⁴⁶ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.34

Conclusions

Peace Journalism offers a fresh approach to conflict transformation in illustrating the promise of a new form of journalism that expands and includes the opportunities for conflict transformation in covering the news. In the past, much academic research has been devoted to the way conflict is covered in the media, as well as the possibilities of Peace Journalism to alter coverage in the future. In addition, there has been research regarding the way in which photojournalism covers conflicts through images in the mainstream press. However, there has been little consideration of how the media, and more specifically photojournalism covers peace, conflict transformation or peace processes – both in print and online. Such limitations provided the motivation for the proposed concept of Peace Photojournalism.

Underlying the hypothesis of this paper was an assumption in which mainstream photojournalism would not discernibly change over the course of a peace process in the types or content of images proffered. This paper considered the example of Northern Ireland in the coverage of photojournalism prior, during and following the peace process to assess if this limited change was in fact observed, or whether changes have been documented with different types of images to mark the political changes inherent in the system. In considering this question, the normative assumption is taken that the images being used should change prior, during and post peace process to reflect the changes in society and the political system at large – in effect, documenting the process of conflict

transformation. Such changes were however not observed in this case study in Northern Ireland.

But then the question arises: *why does this matter?* And this leads to a further normative assumption: that in photo-documenting conflict transformation in this way, Peace Photojournalism will contribute itself to the process of conflict transformation. Of course, the correlation between photojournalism documenting conflict transformation, thereby contributing to it is more difficult to prove. Although beyond the remit of this paper, one can consider the need for audience attitudinal studies and content analyses to assess the impact of photojournalism images of peace on the psyches of the protagonists on the conflict. Not an unachievable task, although with major challenges. One key problem involves how to assess the relative impact of news images and print. Although anecdotally, if one considers the role of news propaganda and many other ways to control the news, then one can understand its potential power to shape the minds of its' readers.

Current Implications of Research

The findings of this research carry relevance for the coverage of contemporary conflicts and their resolution. Chief among current conflicts is the Syrian Peace Process over the course of this decade. While the prevalent images remain those of the violence in the Syrian Civil War and the misery of migration, few have highlighted the early initiatives of the Arab League, the numerous UN-led Geneva Conferences on Syria between 2014

and 2017, or the multi-national discussions of the Vienna Process since 2015. An example of a peace-relevant image is that of Christians and Muslims meeting alongside Arab League monitors in Damascus in 2012.³⁴⁷ Most recently, the peace-building role of Kazakhstan in hosting peace talks with rebel leadership has seen limited photographic coverage, examples of which can be found in the International Meeting on Syrian Settlement in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2017.³⁴⁸

In the last decade, coverage of events by the mainstream press and other media has shifted from a physical print configuration to electronic and online formats. The importance of this analysis, which was centered on newsprint journalism, is only heightened in the current climate of the rapid news cycle, the online coverage of conflict by media and stakeholders, and the predominance of the image in any electronic platform. While news agencies have transferred their traditional modes of reporting into an electronic format with the same rigorous journalism, the proliferation of media outlets, the competition between them, and the speed of the internet have created a shortened news cycle, an intense pressure to be the first to report, and the potential for news images to be uploaded to the web without editorial scrutiny. Potential implications of these developments include the aggravation of conflict and overlooking peaceful imagery, as photos can be posted hastily online and without due consideration to the necessary context and their impact on the peace process.

³⁴⁷ Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AVOA_Arrott_-_A_View_of_Syria%2C_Under_Government_Crackdown_09.jpg

³⁴⁸ Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/a/russia-turkey-iran-monitor-syrian-truce-rebels-skeptical/3691252.html>

Challenges and Future Research

The findings of this analysis suggest that photographic journalism was not used to advance peaceful content or the elements of the peace process, and did not serve to diminish the portrayal of violence and aggression whether prior to, at the peak of, or following violent conflict in Portadown, Northern Ireland. More broadly, such journalism failed to recognize or to grasp opportunities in photography to promote peaceful exchange between affected parties, non-violent conflict resolution, moral position favouring peace, and major developments in the peace process. News media can however elevate the legitimacy of groups working for peace and transform images of the 'other'.³⁴⁹ The manner in which news media, including photographers, "relate to the process can have a significant influence on public perceptions and attitudes" of a conflict and its resolution.³⁵⁰ As noted by Shaw,³⁵¹ the most lacking ingredient to achieving such a function "is the ability of people in conflict situations to represent themselves. Western-dominated global media rarely take seriously the self-representation of individuals, communities, and organizations in zones of conflict". I propose that the form of photographic journalism respecting all of these principles be defined as the discipline of 'Peace Photojournalism'. Future work in this area would develop a model, similar to that formulated by Galtung for Peace Journalism and tabled earlier, setting out the analytical and fieldwork methods applicable to photographic media and its captions.

³⁴⁹ (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.1

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p.43

³⁵¹ (Shaw, 1996), p.182

The present work suggests additional areas of study and important questions essential to the contemporary development of Peace Photojournalism. First, whether in electronic (online) or print format, do images influence conflict, and if so, to what extent? For example, evaluating how media images shape our perceptions of ‘the other’ and our responses would be useful. Similarly, in what ways are each faction’s perceptions of a conflict influenced by images portrayed in the media, in the absence of the Peace Journalism approach? The media environment, defined as “the aggregate of professional beliefs, values and routines that journalists employ” in press coverage,³⁵² merits close scrutiny. For instance, it is important to identify the factors, both in the political environment and in the media environment, that influence the extent to which the press occupy a constructive position in a peace process.³⁵³ Despite the dearth of compatible photographs, the media environment in Northern Ireland became “more conducive to peace”, with the press able “to play a more constructive role” over the period of the present study.³⁵⁴ Certain environments “are more likely to produce positive news about peace because they fundamentally alter their journalists’ working assumptions”.³⁵⁵ Finally, we lack the theoretical tools and understanding to analyze the type of communicative strategies that could strengthen peace.³⁵⁶

Peace Photojournalism, as an applied training activity counter to ‘War Journalism’, could have a long-term impact on the prospects for peace in many parts of the world. Initially, the principles of Peace Photojournalism

³⁵² (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.38-39

³⁵³ Ibid, p.25

³⁵⁴ Ibid, p.159

³⁵⁵ Ibid, p.44

³⁵⁶ (Varis, 1987), p.361

merit further discussion. Future research could also include interviews with experts and research organizations currently exploring the links between peace journalism, peace-building and non-violent conflict resolution, to consider possible areas for future analysis and convergence, both in academic research and in field practice. Examining whether and how Peace Photojournalism contributes to a peace process and to building peace will be vital in the decades ahead.

APPENDIX

Table 2. Summary of Published Images by Newspaper for July Portadown parades in 1996, 1998, and 2000*

Northern Ireland

1a. The Irish News – July 1996

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1996	8 th	1	1	Law and Orange Order... the Orangemen are stopped at Drumcree by lines of RUC yesterday	1	DC
1996	8 th	1	1	Standoff and Deliver...two marchers at Drumcree try to take up a collection from a row of RUC men yesterday	2	DC
1996	8 th	3	1	Drawing the Line...Unionist Party leader David Trimble and Orange Order Grand Master the Rev Martin Smyth face an impenetrable barrier of police yesterday at Drumcree	3	DC
1996	8 th	5	1	RUC-TING Comfortably... time out for the police at yesterday's standoff [officers sleeping in a row against their riot shields]	4	PAB
1996	8 th	5	2	Immovable Faith... protesters gather in front of the church at the centre of the standoff	5	MP
1996	8 th	5	3	Flown In... police with riot shields arrive at Drumcree in a Chinook yesterday [police walking from a helicopter with their shields]	6	PAB
1996	8 th	5	4	Bowing Out... Sir Patrick	7	PP

* Abbreviations for Type of Image: DC, Direct Confrontation; PAB, Police/Authority/Barriers; VV, Visible Violence/Results of Violent Acts; VI, 'Victims'; MP, Mass of Protesters; MA, Marching; PP, Portraits of Major Players; SSM, Signs/Symbols/Maps Related to Conflict; CI, Comic Illustration of Conflict; PM, Peacemaking/Portraits Depicting Peace.

				Mayhew [headshot]		
1996	12 th	1	1	Front Page Title: Betrayed: Who rules Northern Ireland? Shocked... Sarah Dorian and Natalie Corbett watch the Orange parade on television in a hostel where they are living after being driven out of their home [portrait of the girls]	8	VI
1996	12 th	1	2	Below the Front Page Line: Who Rules Northern Ireland? [Picture of the Orangemen marching and being protected by the RUC down Garvaghy Road]	9	MA
1996	12 th	6	1	Fire... RUC riot squad fire plastic bullets at protesters on the Garvaghy Road in Portadown [lots of RUC firing guns] **	10	VV
1996	12 th	6	2	Dragged... Nationalist protesters are dragged off the Garvaghy Road by the RUC **	11	VV
1996	12 th	6	3	View... Orangemen pass the RUC riot squad as they eventually get down the Garvaghy Road	12	MA
1996	12 th	6	4	Strangle Hold... Catholic protesters are removed from Garvaghy Road by the RUC [protesters being violently pulled and dragged]	13	VV
1996	12 th	7	1	Restraint... Gerry Adams ++	14	PM
1996	12 th	7	2	Anger... John Hume	15	PP
1996	12 th	7	3	Questions... Seamus Mallon	16	PP
1996	12 th	9	1	Confrontation... yet again Drumcree has been the scene of clashes between Orangemen, security forces and Nationalist residents (in Letters to the Editor/Opinion) [Orangemen marching and a policeman standing by]	17	MA
1996	12 th	20	1	Defiance... a Nationalist raises his fist after a minivan is torched at Garvaghy	18	SSM

				[protester and minivan on fire] **		
1996	12 th	20	2	Black Day... Cardinal Daly [portrait]	19	PP
1996	12 th	20	3	Disbelieving... Brid Rodgers saw police tactics in Garvaghy Road [portrait of SDLP leader]	20	PP
1996	13 th	5	1	Flashback... the RUC and Orange demonstrators during the Drumcree stand-off [demonstrators and RUC standing facing one another below the shadow of Drumcree church]	21	DC
1996	13 th	6	1	COMIC: Depicting that history has not changed from 1920 & 1996 [the second picture is of Trimble in an Orange outfit marching in front of Orangemen below the Drumcree church]	22	CI
1996	13 th	7	1	Point of Principle... PUP leader David Ervine says Orangemen should have held talks with Breandan MacCionnaith in a bid to reach agreement over the Garvaghy Road dispute [portrait] ++	23	PM
1996	13 th	10	1	Albert Reynolds... 'Anger and Dismay' ++ [portrait – described in the article as a 'peacemaker']	24	PM
1996	13 th	10	2	Flatly Put... a threat to burn the church at the centre of the Drumcree stand-off appeared overnight at Artillery Flats in the new Lodge and could be clearly seen by Orangemen on their parade route **	25	VV
				<u>Total</u>	25	

1b. The Irish News – July 1998

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1998	6 th	1	1	COMIC: Two Orangemen shivering in the rainy cold saying: "Quite Honestly, I wish someone did have the right to stop us standing here for 365 days! [perhaps a reference to the Drumcree protests by Orangemen]	1	CI
1998	6 th	3	1	Stand-Off... Portadown Orangemen gather outside Drumcree Church yesterday after they were barred from returning from a church service via the Garvaghy Road. They have vowed to stand their ground until they are allowed to return to their Orange hall via the Nationalist stronghold	2	MP
1998	6 th	3	2	MAP: Contentious Route... The red area shows the route the Orangemen wish to take, from Drumcree Church, down the Nationalist Garvaghy Road, along Market Street and Church Street, ending at Carlton Street Orange hall	3	SSM
1998	6 th	4	1	The Wire... a Northern Ireland flag lies draped over barbed wire near Drumcree church yesterday	4	SSM
1998	6 th	4	2 (group)	Grouping of six photos of 'The key players at Drumcree' ** [portraits and descriptions of: Ronnie Flanagan, Breadan Mac Cionnaith, Harold Gracey, Alistair Graham, David Trimble, Mo Mowlam]	5	PP
1998	6 th	5	1	Fly the Flag... a Union flag flies from the top of a Church of Ireland church yesterday	6	SSM
1998	6 th	5	2	Through the Barricades... Some of the Orangemen taking part in the stand-off at Drumcree church peer through the barbed wire erected by	7	DC

				the security forces to stop them walking down Garvaghy Road		
1998	6 th	6	1	(Top of Page: Turning the pages of history – how the standoffs began) ** First year... the 1995 standoff as reported by the <i>Irish News</i> set the pattern for following years [picture of 1995 front page]	8	SSM
1998	6 th	6	2	(Top of Page: Turning the pages of history – how the standoffs began) ** All Too Familiar... how the <i>Irish News</i> reported the turn of events after the Drumcree Orange march was pushed through in July 1996 [picture of 1996 front page]	9	SSM
1998	6 th	6	3	(Top of Page: Turning the pages of history – how the standoffs began) ** Confrontation... violence erupted in Nationalist areas last year after the parade was forced down the Garvaghy Road [picture of 1997 front page]	10	SSM
1998	6 th	10	1	On the March... Orangemen are stopped on the road from Drumcree Church towards Garvaghy Road (opinion)	11	DC
1998	13 th	1	1	(Above the Headline: 'Rest in Peace' with a poem below) The Quinn brothers: Jason (8) dead; Mark (9), dead; Lee (12), survived; Richard (10) dead [family portrait of the four boys]	12	VI
1998	13 th	2	1 (group)	[Photo grouping of 2 photos with no caption; perhaps nun and a local in Portadown?]	13	PM
1998	13 th	3	1 (group)	[Photo grouping of three boys, each picture with a caption below that states their names as follows: Murdered: Jason, aged eight Murdered: Mark, aged nine Murdered: Richard, aged 10]	14	VI
1998	13 th	6	1	Looking On... Orangemen at Drumcree admire the fortifications preventing them from getting down the Garvaghy Road [four Orangemen looking at a barbed-wire fence]	15	DC

1998	13 th	5	1	Outraged... Bertie Ahern [portrait accompanying an article about the deaths of the children and a call for peace/resolution]	16	PM
1998	13 th	7	1	New Painting... artists from Belfast, helped by youths from the Garvaghy estate, on Saturday painted a new mural on the Garvaghy Road ** [boy walking past the new mural]	17	SSM
1998	13 th	7	2	End Protest... Jack Straw [portrait... talks about Rule of Law]	18	PP
1998	13 th	7	3	Appeal... Archbishop Sean Brady [portrait ... talks about the need for communication and resolution between communities]	19	PM
1998	13 th	8	1	Lone Thinker... an Orangeman at Drumcree contemplates the eighth day of the standoff [Orangeman sitting near the barbed wire]	20	DC
1998	13 th	8	2	Judgment Criticised... President Mary McAleese has come under fire from the <i>Ireland on Sunday</i> newspaper for hosting a twelfth of July garden party for Orangemen as Aras an Uachtarian over the weekend [portrait]	21	PP
1998	13 th	10	1	Undue Influence... Joel Patton and his followers appear to be drowning out the voices of more moderate Orangemen [portrait]	22	PP
				<u>Total</u>	22	

1c. The Irish News – July 2000

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
2000	10 th	1	1	Back Again: Johnny Adair. Left, arriving at Drumcree church last night where he mingled with protesting Orangemen [Former UFF leader Johnny Adair with Orangemen]	1	PP
2000	10 th	3	1	Down to the Wire: Portadown Orangemen walk past a razor wire cordon erected by the security forces near St. John's Catholic Church	2	DC
2000	10 th	3	2	'Fears': SDLP minister Brid Rodgers	3	PP
2000	10 th	4	1	[Reverend Dr Robert Eames, Archbishop of Armagh standing at a lectern accompanying a statement and a letter from Orangemen]	4	PP
2000	10 th	7	1	COMIC: concerning the Orangemen, parade re-routing and the parades commission and basically the insinuation of how the Orangemen think the entire Drumcree event is a joke	5	CI
2000	12 th	1	1	Geared Up: Police in riot gear prepare for more Loyalist demonstrations in support of Drumcree Orangemen in north Belfast yesterday (under headline: 'Stop the Violence')	6	PAB
2000	12 th	7	1	Respect: Brid Rodgers turns another page in her political career with a central role in defending Nationalist rights in Portadown [portrait in shadow]	7	PP
2000	12 th	8	1 (group)	[Series of four photos under the headline 'Protests lead to orgy of violence' which shows forms of protest in areas other than Portadown, but in support of Drumcree, such as: billboards, protests, an RUC found petrol-bomb-making factory and a tricolour flag]	8	PAB

				burning]		
2000	12 th	11	1	COMIC: about the orange parades	9	CI
2000	13 th	3	1	Crowd Control: Police fire a water cannon at Loyalist rioters in Portadown early yesterday morning as violence continued for the 11 th night in a row. A blast bomb was thrown at police lines and a soldier was set alight with a petrol bomb (Under the headline: “Peaceful protests’ cause more mayhem”)	10	VV
2000	13 th	7	1	Medium Scrum: Even when journalists are able to report from the Orange Order’s side of the police lines, they can be subjected to both verbal and physical abuse from Loyalists. In one incident, a cameraman’s stepladder became a weapon to throw at troops taking cover behind barricades [An Orangemen gathering] (Under the headline: “No news is good news from the hill at Drumcree”)	11	MP
2000	13 th	8	1	Heading Home: An Orangeman holding a decorative pikestaff watches brethren leave the Co Armagh [article is about Orange leaders calling for peaceful protest]	12	MP
				<u>Total</u>	12	

2a. Belfast Telegraph – July 1996

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1996	8 th	1 (late)	1	Parade Stand-off: The scene at Drumcree early this morning as Loyalist numbers started to build up for the second day of the confrontation.	1	MA
1996	8 th	3 (late)	1	Torched wreckage: Forty-eight cars and vans from Lindsay Cars, off the Larne Road Link at Ballymena, were burnt out and another fifty were damaged.	2	VV
1996	8 th	3 (late)	2	Written off: A motor mechanic from Lindsay Cars, Ballymena, checks over one of the burnt-out vehicles taken from their compound last night.	3	VV
1996	8 th	4 (late)	1	No entry: Orange Order members from the country area of Portadown block traffic from entering Portadown town centre, today.	4	MA
1996	8 th	4 (late)	2	Under cover: Orangemen slept out overnight in tents erected in the graveyard at Drumcree.	5	MP
1996	8 th	5	1	Tight spot: Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble squeezes through the RUC line after negotiations with senior RUC officers.	6	PP
1996	8 th	9 (late)	1	The Drumcree stand-off continues as protestors stand face to face with RUC officers. **	7	DC
1996	8 th	9 (late)	2	An Orangeman stares at the police lines at Drumcree while his colleagues find something to smile about.	8	DC
1996	8 th	9 (late)	3	RUC officers take a break from the front-line confrontation.	9	PAB

1996	8 th	9 (late)	4	A sea of orange: The scene at Drumcree as thousands of Orangemen confront the RUC.	10	DC
1996	12 th	3 (late)	1	Burning passions: A masked man, fist raised in a salute, watches as a car burns on. **	11	VV
1996	12 th	3 (late)	2	Home straight: Orangemen and their supporters wait at the end of the Garvaghy Road to greet the marchers.	12	MA
1996	12 th	5 (late)	1	Moving on: Orangemen move through the barbed wire barrier at Drumcree to walk down the Garvaghy Road. **	13	DC
1996	13 th	3 (morning)	1	Night fights: Fireworks and arc lights lit up the sky at the confrontation point outside Drumcree Church.	14	MP
1996	13 th	3 (morning)	2	Marching through: Orangemen from Portadown district parade along Garvaghy Road, protected on all sides by a heavy RUC presence.	15	MA
1996	13 th	3 (morning)	3	Road clashes: TUC officers cleared Nationalist protesters from the Garvaghy Road.	16	PAB
				<u>Total</u>	16	

2b. Belfast Telegraph – July 1998

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1998	6 th	1 (late)	1	Frontline: Orangemen watch and wait at the Army security trench as the event of Day 2 at Drumcree unfold. ** [photo of the British flag flying with Drumcree church in the background]	1	SSM
1998	6 th	5 (late)	1	The Orangemen are stopped by a sea of media and barbed wire when re-routed from the Garvaghy Road.	2	MP
1998	6 th	5 (late)	2	The thousands of Orangemen standing outside Drumcree Church.	3	MP
1998	6 th	7 (late)	1	On the walk: Orangemen make their way to Drumcree Church alongside a heavy military presence.	4	MP
1998	6 th	7 (late)	2	Breandan MacCionnaith being interviewed after having been refused entry to the road near Drumcree Church. [portrait]	5	PP
1998	6 th	7 (late)	3	Guard duty: Police officers ring St. John's Catholic Church as the Orange marchers pass on their way to Drumcree.	6	PAB
1998	13 th			No images printed for July 13th on Drumcree	*	
				<u>Total</u>	6	

2c. Belfast Telegraph – July 2000

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
2000	10 th	1 (late)	1	Portadown Orange leader Harold Gracey speaking to the crowds at Drumcree yesterday.	1	PP
2000	10 th	3 (late)	1	Orangemen walk past razor wire on their way to Drumcree.	2	DC
2000	10 th	4 (late)	1	Orange Order members leaving the scene after yesterday's address by Portadown Orange leader Harold Gracey at the Drumcree security barrier.	3	MP
2000	10 th	4 (late)	2	Leading Loyalist Johnny Adair joins the crowd at Drumcree last night.	4	PP
2000	10 th	5 (late)	1	Orangemen gather at the barrier. Police did not appear to receive their letter of protest.	5	DC
2000	10 th	5 (late)	2	Harold Gracey walks towards the security barrier after yesterday's service in Drumcree.	6	PAB
2000	10 th	11 (late)	1	[Orangemen with a banner flying overhead and the Drumcree church below] **	7	MP
<u>Total</u>					7	

3a. Portadown Times – July 1996

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1996	11 th (8 th)	1	1	The Drumcree parade approaches the police lines after the church service on Sunday. Leading the way are, left to right, David Trimble MP, Jeffrey Donaldson, Assistant Grand Master of the Orange Lodge of Ireland, the Rev Martin Smyth, Grand Master of the Orange Lodge of Ireland, Harold Gracey, District Master Portadown LOL, and George Patton, Executive Officer of the Orange Lodge of Ireland.	1	DC
1996	11 th (8 th)	2	1	Protesters gather to block the Bann Bridge at Edenderry on Monday afternoon	2	MP
1996	11 th (8 th)	2	2	Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble puts an orange lily on his collarette before taking part in Sunday's Orange parade. Mr. Trimble is a member of Bangor District and has taken part in each Drumcree parade since being elected MP for Upper Bann in 1990	3	PP
1996	11 th (8 th)	3	1	The message is clear from this protester at Drumcree stand off	4	VI
1996	11 th (8 th)	4	1	Waiting Game: The waiting begins for protesters and police outside Drumcree Church after marchers were prevented from making their way along the Garvaghy Road	5	PAB
1996	11 th (8 th)	5	1	The Drumcree parade makes its way towards the police lines after Sunday's church service	6	DC
1996	11 th (8 th)	5	2	Alex Hyde, District standard bearer leads the Orangemen out of Carleton Street on Sunday morning	7	MA
1996	11 th (8 th)	6	1	A hijacked lorry is set ablaze at the town's West Street roundabout	8	VV
1996	11 th (8 th)	6	2	On parade: Members of the Portadown Ex-Servicemen's LOL	9	MA

				No. 608 parade through the town on Sunday morning		
1996	11 th (8 th)	7	1	Strain shows: The strain shows on the face of the Rev Martin Smyth, Grand Master of the Orange Lodge of Ireland, as the Drumcree parade reaches the RUC lines on Sunday.	10	PP
1996	11 th (8 th)	8	1	'We have to stand firm': Portadown LOL District Master Harold Gracey to the centre of attention as the Drumcree parade is halted by the RUC on Sunday	11	MP
1996	11 th (8 th)	8	2	Portadown district officers and visiting dignitaries lead the parade of 2,000 Orangemen through the centre of Portadown on Sunday morning on their way to Drumcree Parish Church	12	MA
1996	11 th (8 th)	9	1	Television journalist Kate Adie is famous for her coverage from trouble spots throughout the world. Sunday brought her and the world's media to Portadown for the controversial Drumcree parade	13	SSM
1996	11 th (8 th)	9	2	David Trimble makes a point during Sunday morning's Press conference in Carleton Street Orange Hall. Also pictured from left, Denis Watson, County Grand Master, Harold Gracey, executive officer of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland.	14	PP
1996	11 th (8 th)	10	1	Members of the LOL No.25 parading to Drumcree on Sunday morning.	15	MA
1996	11 th (8 th)	10	2	Bowler hats, white gloves and umbrellas were a 'must' for members of Portadown Ex-Servicemen's LOL No. 608 as they took part in Sunday's church parade	16	MA
1996	11 th (8 th)	10	3	Stand-off starts: A section of the crowd line the route from Drumcree church on Sunday after the RUC prevented the parade from making its way back via the Garvaghy Road.	17	PAB

1996	19 th (12/13 th)	1	1	Across the lines: So near, yet so far apart. A picture that sums up the mood of Portadown on July 11, 1996. Orangemen finally march down Garvaghy Road as the local residents are kept back by a line of police in riot gear and a screen of Land Rovers. The dramatic change of heart by Chief Constable Sir Hugh Annesley in allowing the parade ended the four-day siege, but left the town more divided than ever.	18	PAB
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	2	1	A highjacked Fiat Panda blazes in the middle of Garvaghy Road.	19	VV
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	3	1	Frustration in the face of one woman as she surveys the scene during the protest. [close up portrait]	20	VI
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	4	1	Roman Catholic Cardinal Cahal Daly with the residents of Craigwell Avenue on the 12 th night as they discuss the damage done during the previous evening.	21	PM
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	4	2	Mrs. Christine Reynolds of Craigwell Avenue with a concrete block that smashed through her window on the 11 th night.	22	VI
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	4	3	Mrs. Lorraine Heath of Churchill Park, with daughter Orlagh (3). Show a plastic bullet that crashed through their living room window just before three o'clock on the morning of the 13 th during the riots in the area.	23	VI
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	5	1	The smashed windows of Mr. David Webb's home in Woodside Green.	24	VV
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	5	2	One of several boarded-up windows on Woodside Green.	25	VV
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	6	1	Brethren of Portadown District LOL no. 1 lead the marchers under the bridge and into Castle Street.	26	MA
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	6	2	Alderman Mervyn Carrick	27	PP
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	7	1	Crowds waiting opposite Shillingtons wait as the Orangemen approach following their walk from Garvaghy Road. [article on bias in media reporting on this page]	28	MA
1996	19 th	7	2	Police move in to disperse	29	VV

	(12/13 th)			protesters during the attempted blockage of Garvaghy Road. **		
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	8	1	Face-to-face. Cardinal Cahal Daly and Mr. John McKeown discuss the happening on Craigwell Avenue, along with other residents of the street.	30	PM
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	8	2	Jesuit priest Fr. Brian Lennon was the fore at Garvaghy Road as the Orange parade passed through on Thursday.	31	PM
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	9	1	Upper Bann MP David Trimble acknowledges the reception of the crowds as the Orange marchers complete their walk from Garvaghy Road.	32	PP
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	9	2	The scene of destruction as a hijacked car burns in the middle of the Garvaghy Road.	33	VV
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	10	1	The massive wall of police in riot gear separating residents and protesters from the Orangemen on Garvaghy Road. [appears with the varying coverage and thoughts on the possibility for peace]	34	DC
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	11	1	The aftermath of violence as burned-out vehicles and debris lie strewn across Garvaghy Road. [appears with the varying coverage and thoughts on the possibility for peace]	35	VV
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	12	1	Sit-down protest: Tempers begin to fray as the police move in to break up the sit-down protest on the Garvaghy Road.	36	DC
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	13	1	Aftermath of the trouble: Protesters stand in the middle of Garvaghy Road as a hijacked van, toppled on to its side, burns amid the debris.	37	VV
1996	19 th (12/13 th)	13	2	Defiant salute: Fist clenched in defiance, a Garvaghy Road protester stands by a burning car during the trouble.	38	VV
				<u>Total</u>	38	

3b. Portadown Times – July 1998

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1998	10 th (6 th)	1	1	A Town Divided: There are two sieges in Portadown this year. The Siege of Drumcree and the Siege of Garvaghy Road. The picture shows the latter as Loyalists gather at the lower entrance to the Garvaghy Road where Army-erected barriers keep the two sides apart. The community and politicians in Garvaghy are complaining the people are hemmed in, and the protesters are regularly moved away by the security forces as Drumcree Four continues. ** [Headline is “The road to ruin”]	1	PAB
1998	10 th (6 th)	3	1	Councilor Joe Duffy [portrait]	2	PP
1998	10 th (6 th)	3	2	Several rallies were held in the centre of Portadown this week demanding the right to march and these women and children make their feelings clear.	3	MP
1998	10 th (6 th)	4	1	Smiles and shouts. Seamus Mallon, the Deputy First Minister in the Assembly, and his SDLP Assembly colleague Brid Rodgers leave the meeting at Churchill Park where some of the residents shouted and catcalled at them. [The headline of the accompanying article is “Peace move fails”]	4	PP
1998	10 th (6 th)	4	2	Breandan MacClonnaith briefs journalists after a meeting of the Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition.	5	PM
1998	10 th (6 th)	5	1	War veterans Albert Rusk (third right) and Alex Hyde (centre) and fellow members of the Portadown Ex-Servicemen’s LOL 608, with – from left – William Percy, Wenford	6	PAB

				Maguire, Wesley Totten, Fred Oliver and Eddie Stewart. [group photo]		
1998	10 th (6 th)	6	1	The burned-out car at the Dobbin area on the main Portadown-Armagh Road on Monday.	7	VV
1998	10 th (6 th)	6	2	Surveying the scene: Breandan MacClonnaith watches the Orange parade on its way to the service at Drumcree Parish Church. **	8	MA
1998	10 th (6 th)	7	1	The Orangemen came to a standstill at the security barrier at the bottom of Drumcree hill.	9	PAB
1998	10 th (6 th)	7	2	The Mayor, Alderman Mervyn Carrick [portrait] [with article calling for cool and failing to take sides] **	10	PP
1998	10 th (6 th)	8	1	Paisley speaking with an unidentified man (Trimble?) and a police officer.	11	PP
1998	10 th (6 th)	9	1	The international media captured the moment on camera, on sound and in notebooks when Portadown District Master Mr. Harold Gracey reached the security barrier at the bottom of Drumcree hill on Sunday morning. ** [the photo shows Gracey surrounded by journalists and photographers] [Also look at article with the title "Trimble and Mallon in plea for peace"] **	12	PAB
1998	10 th (6 th)	10	1	On the march: A group of women and children on a protest march through Portadown.	13	MA
1998	10 th (6 th)	10	2	From a distance... Sunday morning's Orange parade passes St John the Baptist Roman Catholic Church.	14	MA
1998	10 th (6 th)	11	1	Head start for two: Two members of Derryhale LOL No. 81, John Gilbert and Tommy Johnston in relaxed mood before setting out on the walk	15	PM

				to Drumcree Parish Church on Sunday morning.		
1998	10 th (6 th)	11	2	Alan Milligan (right) serves a thirsty customer at the temporary tea and sandwich stand at Drumcree. Townswomen from Portadown have organised a rota for sandwich-making to feed the Orangemen and their supporters involved in the stand-off.	16	PM
1998	10 th (6 th)	13	1	Denis Watson – ‘maverick’ Ulster Unionist [portrait]	17	PP
1998	10 th (6 th)	13	2	On the line: One of the busiest men on the Orange side over the past week has been Press officer David Jones who was interviewed by the local, national and international media as the story unfolded. TV cameras wait as he conducts a radio interview via the vital mobile telephone on Monday.	18	PP
1998	10 th (6 th)	13	3	Mervyn Gregson with daughter Katie and mother Agnes.	19	PM
1998	10 th (6 th)	14	1	Content in tent. Sandy Hewitt, Worshipful Master of Battlehill LOL 395 prepares to bed down at Drumcree “for as long as it takes to get the parade down the Garvaghy Road”.	20	PAB
1998	10 th (6 th)	15	1	On the march, with protesters held at bay behind barbed wire. **	21	MA
1998	10 th (6 th)	34	1	All quiet at Drumcree on Saturday morning, as a soldier keeps watch.	22	PAB
1998	10 th (6 th)	34	2	Pastor Kenny McClinton who helped organise the service in Portadown town centre on Sunday morning.	23	PM
1998	17 th (13 th)	1	1	[Picture of mother and son (at the Orange Parade?) smiling.]	24	PM
1998	17 th (13 th)	1	2	[Drumcree church and Orangemen behind barbed wire]	25	PAB
1998	17 th (13 th)	2	1	First Minister David Trimble	26	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	2	2	It’s the same in many parts of the world and Drumcree is no different – soldiers on duty invariably make friends with the children caught in a conflict not of her own making. Two young boys sitting on the wall chat with soldiers of the Argyll and	27	PM

				Sutherland Highlanders stationed in Portadown.		
1998	17 th (13 th)	4	1	Ken Maginnis [portrait of the Ulster Unionist security spokesman]	28	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	4	2	[Protesters at Drumcree, RUC officers and the dividing barbed wire between them.]	29	PAB
1998	17 th (13 th)	5	1	Firemen douse the shell of a car hijacked and burned near the Stonebridge roundabout on the main Portadown-Armagh road. **	30	VV
1998	17 th (13 th)	5	2	Security forces at the ready at Drumcree. [silhouette of one RUC officer]	31	PAB
1998	17 th (13 th)	5	3	This wasn't what Orangemen wanted in support of their protest at Drumcree – a bus burned out after being hijacked near the Loyalist Parkmore estate.	32	VV
1998	17 th (13 th)	6	1	Former GAA president Peter Quinn was one of the mediators in the talks between the Orange Order and Garvaghy Road residents.	33	PM
1998	17 th (13 th)	6	2	Two streakers make their way to the police lines at the field at Drumcree last weekend, much to the amusement of a crowd of spectators.	34	PAB
1998	17 th (13 th)	7	1	The Reverend William Bingham. [portrait]	35	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	7	2	David Jones, spokesperson for the Portadown Orangemen, takes another call on his mobile at Drumcree. [portrait]	36	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	7	3	One man and his dog – ready for battle [RUC officer with a police dog]	37	PAB
1998	17 th (13 th)	8	1	Portadown District Master Mr. Harold Gracey chats to Pastor McClinton in the town centre. McClinton conducted the service in the town centre organized by Portadown women before the parade left for Drumcree.	38	PM
1998	17 th (13 th)	8	2	A defiant Loyalist displays the Ulster Flag at the security fence at Drumcree on Sunday morning.	39	SSM
1998	17 th (13 th)	9	1	Two men attempt to erect a flag on the barricade at Drumcree hill.	40	SSM
1998	17 th	9	2	Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam	41	PP

	(13 th)			[portrait]		
1998	17 th (13 th)	9	3	Keeping watch... A group of Orangemen discussed the morning's happenings at Drumcree on Sunday morning while a young boy surveys the security lines through a pair of binoculars.	42	PAB
1998	17 th (13 th)	10	1	Discussing the lie of the land at Drumcree. [three Orangemen talk beside British and Ulster flags on a makeshift pole with Drumcree church in the background]	43	MP
1998	17 th (13 th)	10	2	Workers Party President Tom French. [portrait]	44	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	10	3	DUP Assemblyman Mervyn Carrick. [portrait]	45	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	10	4	Assembly member Brid Rodgers. [portrait]	46	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	11	1	Parades Commissioner Alastair Graham – the commission lack credibility according to UUP deputy leader John Taylor. [portrait in front of microphones at press conference]	47	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	11	2	Prime Minister Tony Blair. [portrait]	48	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	11	3	There was no doubting this young boy's allegiance as he surveyed the police lines near Drumcree Parish Church on Sunday. [boy looking at the camera holding on the corner of a British flag] **	49	SSM
1998	17 th (13 th)	12-13	1	Troops and protestors face each other across the barricades.	SC 1	DC
1998	17 th (13 th)	12-13	2	These two little girls get a lesson in photography.	SC 2	PM
1998	17 th (13 th)	12-13	3	A burned-out van on West Street, Portadown.	SC 3	VV
1998	17 th (13 th)	12-13	4	Garvaghy Road residents distribute food sent to them from other parts of the province.	SC 4	PM
1998	17 th (13 th)	12-13	5	Saying it with a mural on the Garvaghy Road.	SC 5	SSM
1998	17 th (13 th)	12-13	6	On the road again: Orangemen involved in the standoff at Drumcree held their own parade, marching from Dungannon Road to the church and then into the field.	SC 6	MA
1998	17 th	12-	7	Surveying the scene on the Twelfth.	SC 7	PAB

	(13 th)	13				
1998	17 th (13 th)	12- 13	8	Women of Portadown on the march, accompanied by DUP Assembly man and Craigavon Mayor, Alderman Mervyn Carrick.	SC 8	MA
1998	17 th (13 th)	12- 13	9	[A mass of protestors at Drumcree]	SC 9	MP
1998	17 th (13 th)	12- 13	10	A moat point... Orangemen take a close look at the 'moat' created by the Army as part of the security measures around the fields at Drumcree to prevent them walking their traditional route back into town along Garvaghy Road.	SC 10	PAB
1998	17 th (13 th)	12- 13	11	At The Open Fire.	SC 11	VV
1998	17 th (13 th)	12- 13	12	Mrs. Delma Black shows her support for the Orangemen at Drumcree during a march through Portadown by a group of women and children.	SC 12	MA
1998	17 th (13 th)	18	1	Children in road blockade: Children sit on the roadway in support of the Orangemen at Drumcree during a peaceful protest at Charles Street.	50	MP
1998	17 th (13 th)	18	2	Portadown District Master Harold Gracey spells out the message – 'We are staying here for as long as it takes.' [portrait of speaking in a microphone]	51	PP
1998	17 th (13 th)	19	1	The two sides eye each other across the barricades.	52	DC
1998	17 th (13 th)	19	2	Barriers that divide the town: Soldiers man the security barrier at the junction of Garvaghy Road and Park Road.	53	PAB
				<u>Total</u>	65 53 + 12 Special Coverage (SC) photos	

3c. Portadown Times – July 2000

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	1	1	Police and protesters face one another on Monday night when Portadown erupted into violence.	1	PAB
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	1	2	First Minister David Trimble. [portrait]	2	PP
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	2	1	Portadown town centre was deserted on Monday afternoon – a combination of the Orange protest and a bomb alert.	3	VV
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	2	2	A car was hijacked and dumped onto the railway lines at West St. during the height of Monday night's rioting.	4	VV
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	3	1	The unacceptable face of protest, say the police. A man appears at the barbed-wire defenses at Drumcree and appears to throw a missile at the security forces. It was just one incident in the sporadic rioting in the week between the two parades that were banned from entering the Garvaghy Road.	5	VV
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)			A message in a battle! LOL 903 trumpeted its message to the world with a message on a placard turned towards the cameras of the media. **	6	SSM
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	4	1	A soldier at work at Drumcree, preparing the security fortifications in readiness for the arrival of Portadown District LOL No. 1 and their supporters on Sunday. A ring of steel surrounds the Garvaghy Road's estates, with a huge engineers-built barrier blocking the road leading to them and razor wire fencing turning the landscape into a near-battle zone.	7	PAB
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	4	2	Brid Rodgers MLA [portrait]	8	PP
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	4	3	Two men with key roles to play in the Drumcree crisis – RUC Chief Constable, Sir Ronnie Flanagan (left), and Secretary of State, Peter	9	PP

				Mandelson. The Chief Constable has called on the Orange order to distance itself from the violence: the Secretary of State has vowed not to yield to bully boy tactics. [two men in profile portrait seeming to be discussing something]		
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	5	1	The scene at Drumcree at lunch time on Sunday, when Portadown District LOL No. 1 paraded as far as the massive security barrier and then listened to District Master, Harold Gracey, who called for on-going protests in support of their bid to complete the homeward walk using their traditional route.	10	PAB
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	5	2	Harold Gracey [portrait]	11	PP
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	5	3	Johnny Adair from Belfast's Shankhill Road. The former UFF leader released under license as part of the Good Friday Agreement having been sentenced to 16 years for directing violence, has been at Drumcree a lot in recent days, fuelling speculation of a joining forces on the part of the LVF and UFF – which he denies – and leading to criticism of the Orange Order from many quarters, for associating with a convicted terrorist. [portrait]	12	PP
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	6	1	An essential item for Sunday's parade was the umbrella, with heavy intermittent showers the order of the day.	13	SSM
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	6	2	Portadown District Secretary Nigel Dawson was among the leaders of Sunday's parade to Drumcree.	14	PP
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	6	3	Some smiling, some pensive as the 'Drumcree Sunday' parade makes its way to the Church of the Ascension.	15	MA
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	6	4	Some of the contingent of Orangewomen making their way through the town centre to Drumcree.	16	MA
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	7	1	Under cover – a sea of umbrellas was vital against the heavy showers at Drumcree on Sunday.	17	SSM
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	8	1	'Real Victims' make point at Drumcree: Members of the 'Real	18	PM

				Victims' Support Group' laid a wreath at the security barrier at Drumcree on Sunday morning, the second successive year they have done so. In 1999, the wreath-laying ceremony marked the end of the Long March from Londonderry to Drumcree. ** [The words on the banner with members of the group say 'No Terrorists in Government.']		
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	8	2	This painted sign in the Edgarstown area reveals how the protestors view the current situation. ** [the sign reads 'Better to Die on Your Feet than Live on Your (scratched out – perhaps 'Ass') No Surrender.'	19	SSM
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	8	3	In the Picture: Alan Milligan, a prominent Portadown Orangeman and a member of Drumcree's select vestry, raises his eyes to the heavens at Drumcree on Sunday when, for the third year in a row, members of Portadown District LOL No. 1 were banned by the Parades Commission from returning to their dispersal point via the traditional Garvaghy Road route.	20	PP
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	9	1	It's an international event on the hill now: The annual service at Drumcree nowadays attracts 'observers' from all over the world – usually at the behest of the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition, much to the angst of the Orangemen. But, as this picture shows, they can rely on others for support, too.	21	MP
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	9	2	The scene in Portadown on Wednesday evening, with protestors taking to the streets in response to the call for demonstrations in support of the Drumcree stance. Later, as was the case in so many parts of the province, it degenerated into the sort of violence condemned by Archbishop Robin Eames (inset [small portrait superimposed on the larger image]). **	22	MP
2000	14 th (10/12/13 th)	9	3	A soldier keeps a close eye on the marchers as the Orange parade makes its way to Drumcree Parish Church for Sunday morning's service. **	23	PAB
				<u>Total</u>	23	

Republic of Ireland

4a. The Irish Times – July 1996

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1996	8 th	1	1	The Ulster Unionist Party leader, Mr. David Trimble, squeezing through the RUC lines after negotiations with senior officers in an attempt to end the stand-off at Drumcree Parish Church [Mr. Trimble in the middle of a line of RUC officers]	1	PP
1996	8 th	9	1	The beginning of the stand-off: RUC officers blocking Orangemen from walking down Garvaghy Road, Portadown, from Drumcree Parish Church where they held a short service.	2	DC
1996	8 th	9	2	The Rev Ian Paisley passing through RUC lines to talk with senior RUC officers. **	3	MP
1996	8 th	9	3	[Map of the Portadown / Drumcree march]	4	SSM
1996	8 th	9	4	[Map of the Protests at Orange Services in support of the Drumcree stand-off]	5	SSM
1996	12 th	1	1	Nationalist protesters are removed from Garvaghy Road by RUC officers yesterday to make way for the Orange Order march ** [Protesters bring dragged by the face by RUC officers]	6	VV
1996	12 th	6	1	A police officer fires a plastic bullet as the RUC comes under attack on the Garvaghy Road, Portadown, during yesterday's Orange parade. ** [police officer pointing a gun]	7	VV
1996	12 th	6	2	A youth throws a bottle at RUC officers shielding Orange marchers as they made their way down the Garvaghy Road yesterday. ** [youth throwing a bottle] (comparison between the two photos in the layout) **	8	VV
1996	12 th	8	1	Orangemen march down Garvaghy Road in Portadown yesterday following the RUC decision to allow the parade to pass through the Nationalist area. The	9	MA

				marchers were flanked by hundreds of RUC men.		
1996	12 th	9	1	A Garvaghy Road resident remonstrates with Orange marchers ** [line of Orange marchers with one woman arguing with them with her hands]	10	DC
1996	12 th	9	2	Protesters outside the British Embassy in Dublin yesterday ** [protesters in support of the Drumcree marchers with signs]	11	MP
1996	12 th	9	3	Sir Hugh Annesley: defended his decision [portrait of the RUC Chief Constable who made the decision to allow the Orangemen to march down the Garvaghy Road]	12	PP
1996	12 th	14	1	Mr. David Trimble pictured at Drumcree with Orange supporters. He affirmed yesterday that no compromise had been agreed.	13	PP
1996	13 th	10	1	An Orange standard-bearer is greeted with a kiss on arrival in Portadown after marching through Garvaghy Road on Thursday. The town has a historic significance for Orangemen. **	14	SSM
1996	13 th	10	2	Lloyd George: was told the Home Rule Bill might pass in the Houses of Parliament, "but it will not pass the bridge at Portadown". [old portrait of Lloyd George accompanying an article understanding the importance of the parades for Orangemen]	15	PP
1996	13 th	10	3	Mr. David Trimble: advance knowledge of RUC about-face? [portrait of Trimble accompanying an article about parade decision]	16	PP
1996	13 th	12	1	COMIC: Orangemen chatting near the rubble with the following bubble caption... 'Now that's over we can get back to the peace, reconciliation and agreed government talks...'	17	CI
				<u>Total</u>	17	

4b. The Irish Times – July 1998

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1998	6 th	1	1	Orangemen massed behind the wire fence erected by security forces face a phalanx of RUC officers in riot gear, as they take two Loyalists into custody in on of the few incidents at Drumcree yesterday.	1	VV
1998	6 th	6	1	An RUC officer falls to his knees after being struck by a missile thrown by a Loyalist during clashes in Belfast last night. The police came under attack from Loyalist youths protesting at the refusal to permit the Drumcree Orange parade to pass down the Garvaghy Road in Portadown.	2	VV
1998	6 th	7	1	Orange Order officials are forced to stop at a barbed-wire barricade in Drumcree yesterday. After their service at Drumcree church, the Orangemen marched down to RUC lines but there was no senior officer there to take their letter of protest. **	3	DC
1998	6 th	7	2	[Map of the Portadown Orange March]	4	SSM
1998	6 th	3	1	An RUC officer surveys the blackened walls of the Ballymoney house in which three young boys lost their lives after a sectarian arson attack	5	VV
1998	6 th	4	1	Soldiers put up barbed wire on the roadblock at Drumcree church after it was broken through on Saturday night. [Spectators (including an Orangeman in uniform looking on)]	6	DC
1998	6 th	5	1	Archbishop Eames: "People have got to live together on this island. People have got to find ways of living together" [portrait/headshot of the Archbishop]	7	PP
				<u>Total</u>	7	

4c. The Irish Times – July 2000

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
2000	10 th	1	1	Members of the Orange Order taking shelter under umbrellas at the security barrier blocking entry to the Garvaghy Road.	1	PAB
2000	10 th	6	1	The RUC using water cannons borrowed from Belgian police to repel protesters last Tuesday.	2	VV
2000	10 th	6	2	The Archbishop of Armagh, Dr Robin Eames: "Peaceful protest is no longer visible – there are those with other agendas." [portrait/headshot of the Archbishop]	3	PP
2000	10 th	7	1	A protester is caught by RUC officers after making his way through the security forces' defences at Drumcree last night. **	4	VV
2000	10 th	7	2	Mr. Harold Gracey, District master of the Portadown Orange Lodge, addressing the large crowd at Drumcree yesterday. **	5	PP
2000	10 th	14	1	Men behind the wire: members of Portadown's Orange Order march past razor wire as they head towards Drumcree Parish Church yesterday.	6	PAB
2000	10 th	14	2	An Orangeman at Drumcree church yesterday captures the scene. ** (accompanying an article on the peace process)	7	SSM
2000	12 th			No images published for the 12th day of July 2000	*	
2000	13 th			No images published for the 13th day of July 2000	*	
				<u>Total</u>	7	

5a. The Irish Independent – July 1996

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1996	8 th	4	1	An angry Ian Paisley, in traditional Orange Order sash, passing through the RUC lines in Portadown yesterday, to negotiate with RUC officers after the parade was prevented from walking through the Nationalist area of the town.	1	DC
1996	8 th	4	2	Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble MP being [prevented] from leading the parade down the Garvaghy Road.	2	DC
1996	12 th	1	1	Sit-down defiance...Steel booted RUC men move in to remove Nationalist protesters from the Garvaghy Road prior to the Orange Order march.	3	DC
1996	12 th	11	1	RUC officers with batons drawn moving in to remove the Nationalists blocking the Garvaghy Road yesterday.	4	VV
1996	12 th	11	2	Little mercy was shown as the RUC dragged the protesting Nationalist residents from the Garvaghy Road.	5	VV
1996	12 th	11	3	Cardinal Daly: talks [portrait]	6	PP
1996	12 th	11	4	Members of the Orange Order marching down Garvaghy Road accompanied by a massive RUC presence.	7	MA
1996	12 th	12	1	Final plea...a woman pleads with Orange Order marchers as they parade through the Nationalist Garvaghy neighbourhood.	8	MA
1996	12 th	13	1	Sir Patrick: plea to SDLP leaders.	9	PP
1996	12 th	13	2	An RUC officer, backed up by a baton-wielding colleague, fires a plastic bullet at rioting Nationalists in	10	VV

				the Garvaghy Estate after the Orange parade was allowed to march down Garvaghy Road yesterday.		
1996	13 th	8	1	'A victory for liberty': Paisley [Ian Paisley portrait]	11	PP
1996	13 th	9	1	Children at play near the remains of a burned-out lorry on the Nationalist Bogside of Derry, following a night of rioting in the wake of the Drumcree stand-down by the RUC, which allowed the Orange parade down Garvaghy Road.	12	VV
1996	13 th	9	2	Sir Hugh: due to retire [portrait]	13	PP
1996	13 th	9	3	Cardinal Daly...war of words	14	PP
				<u>Total</u>	14	

5b. The Irish Independent – July 1998

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1998	6 th	1	1	A British soldier checks razor wear in fields around Drumcree Parish Church.	1	PAB
1998	6 th	11	1	Stern displeasure: Orange Order officials stop their procession at a barbed wire and fabricated steel barricade blocking their way into Garvaghy Road at lunchtime yesterday.	2	DC
1998	6 th	11	2	Tense RUC officers block the marchers at Drumcree Bridge.	3	DC
1998	6 th	11	3	An Orange supporter is snatched from the 'sterile' area by RUC men yesterday.	4	VV
1998	6 th	14	1	[picture of Orangemen looking through barbed wire at Drumcree]	5	PAB
1998	13 th	11	1	Crisis update...Brendan MacCoinnaith (above), spokesman for the Garvaghy residents in Portadown, speaking to the media.	6	PP
1998	13 th	11	2	A soldier re-inforces barricades at Drumcree yesterday.	7	PAB
				<u>Total</u>	7	

5c. The Irish Independent – July 2000

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
2000	10 th	1	1	One for the album...an Orangeman takes a photograph as he stands at the barrier separating Orangemen and the security forces at Drumcree Church in Portadown yesterday. **	1	PAB
2000	10 th	1	2	Loyalist leader Johnnie Adair (in white tee-shirt) arriving at Drumcree Church last night.	2	PP
2000	10 th	7	1	Behind the wire...Orangemen walking past barbed wire erected by the security forces near St. John's Catholic Church in Portadown.	3	PAB
2000	10 th	8	1	Orangemen led by Harold Gracey parade to the barrier separating them and the security forces at Drumcree Church in Portadown yesterday.	4	DC
2000	12 th			No images published for the 12th day of July 2000	*	
2000	13 th			No images published for the 13th day of July 2000	*	
				<u>Total</u>	4	

Britain (outside Northern Ireland)

6a. The Times – July 1996

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1996	8 th	2	1	Police confront Orangemen on the Drumcree Road, barring their way through a Catholic area of Portadown ** [image of back of RUC officers and the angered faces of some Orangemen being blocked from marching]	1	DC
1996	12 th	1	1	An RUC officer fires in defence of the marchers ** [RUC officer with gun pointed]	2	VV
1996	12 th	2	1	Garvaghy Road: RUC officer seizing one of about 300 Nationalist protesters ** [RUC officer holding head of scared protester]	3	VV
1996	13 th	10	1 (group)	Moderates hope for a gesture from Trimble, left, to reassure democratic Nationalists such as Mallon [Portraits of Trimble and Mallon accompanying an article about the peace process and the marches]	4	PP
				<u>Total</u>	4	

6b. The Times – July 1998

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
1998	6 th	4	1	Orangemen peer through rolls of barbed wire close to Drumcree church yesterday. A huge military operation prevented them from marching along the Garvaghy Road **	1	PAB
1998	6 th	4	2	Tense: a soldier peers put of the barricades	2	PAB
1998	6 th	4	3	Trimble: Close contact [portrait of David Trimble]	3	PP
1998	13 th	2	1	Orangemen looking over the defences at Drumcree yesterday. Their total number was a fraction of the thousands who turned out a week earlier ** (under the title: 'Balaclava hijacks the bowler hat') [four men looking down at the barbed wire]	4	PAB
1998	13 th	2	2	A mural in the Garvaghy Road, from which marching Orangemen have been barred ** [picture of the Nationalist billboards with a little boy walking past them]	5	SSM
1998	13 th	3	1	The boys who died: (from left) Jason, 7, Mark, 9, and Richard, 11. Behind them is their brother, Lee, who was staying with his grandparents [family portrait of the four Quinn boys]	6	VI
1998	13 th	3	2	A policeman outside the blaze house. Yesterday some Catholics were leaving the estate [picture of two houses that have a burn mark down the middle]	7	VV
				<u>Total</u>	7	

6c. The Times – July 2000

Year	Date (July)	Page #	Photo #	Image Content	#	Type
2000	10	1	1	COMIC: A cartoon that questions the changing tactics of the Orangemen with an 'Orange Fun Run' sign in the front of one Orangeman's shirt	1	CI
2000	10	4	1	Orangemen led by Harold Gracey, centre, halt their parade at the barrier separating the Loyalists and the security forces as Drumcree Church ** [Picture of Harold Gracey looking directly at the camera surrounded by Orangemen with Drumcree church in the background]	2	PP
2000	10	4	2 (group)	Power players: Flannagan, Lewis, Mac Cionnaith [three individual portraits of those involved in the Drumcree battle]	3	PP
2000	12 th			No images published for the 12th day of July 2000	*	
2000	13 th			No images published for the 13th day of July 2000	*	
				<u>Total</u>	3	

Total, 272 + 12 special coverage images = 284 total images (all newspapers)

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